SUPREME COURT LEADING CASES WITH SHORT NOTES

1. His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala[1973] Supp SCR 1 2. Maneka Gandhi v Union of India [1978]2 SCR 621 3. Minerva Mills Ltd and Ors v Union of Indiaand Ors [1981]1 SCR 206 4. Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda v State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88 5. A R Antulay v R S Nayak and Anr [1988] Supp 1 SCR 1 6. Kihoto Hollohan v Zachillhu and Others [1992] 1 SCR 686 7. Indra Sawhney and Ors v Union of India and Ors [1992] Supp 2 SCR 454 8. S R Bommai and Ors v Union of India and Ors [1994] 2 SCR 644 9. L Chandra Kumarv Union of India and Ors [1994]Supp 6 SCR 261 10. Vellore CitizensWelfare Forum v Union of India and Ors [1996]Supp 5 SCR 241 11. D K Basu v State of West Bengal [1996] Supp 10 SCR 284 12. Mafatlal Industries Ltd v Union of India[1996] Supp 10 SCR 585 13.Vishaka and Ors v State of Rajasthan and Ors [1997] Supp 3 SCR 404 14. Githa Hariharan and Anr v ReserveBank of India and Anr [1999] 1 SCR 669 15. Rupa Ashok Hurra v Ashok Hurra and Anr [2002] 2 SCR 1006 16. Pradeep Kumar Biswas and Ors v Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors [2002] 3 SCR 100 17. P Rama Chandra Rao v State of Karnataka[2002] 3 SCR 60 18. TMA Pai Foundation and Ors v State of Karnataka and Ors [2002] Supp 3 SCR 587 19. P A Inamdar v State of Karnataka (2004)8 SCC 139

20.Technip SA v SMS HoldingPvt Ltd and Ors [2005] Supp 1 SCR 223 21. SBP and Co v Patel Engineering Ltd and Anr [2005] Supp 4 SCR 688 22. Rameshwar Prasadand Ors v Union of India and Anr [2006] 1 SCR 562 23. IR Coelho Dead by LRs v State of Tamil Nadu [2007] 1 SCR 706 24. Common Cause v Union of India and Ors [2008] 6 SCR 262 25. State of West Bengaland Ors v The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights [2010] 2 SCR 979 26. Selvi and Ors v State of Karnataka [2010]5 SCR 381 27. Re Special Reference No 1 of 2012 [2012] 9 SCR 311 28. Republic of Italy and Ors v Union of India and Ors [2013] 4 SCR 595 29. Novartis AG v Union of India and Ors [2013] 13 SCR 148 30. Dr Balram Prasad v Dr Kunal Saha and Ors [2013] 12 SCR 30 31. Lalita Kumari v Govt of UP and Ors [2013] 14 SCR 713 32. National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and Ors [2014] 5 SCR 119 33. Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust and Ors v Unionof India and Ors [2014] 11 SCR 712 34. Kailash Nath Associates v Delhi Development Authority and Anr [2015] 1 SCR 627 35. Shreya Singhalv Union of India [2015]5 SCR 963 36. Supreme Court AOR Association and Anr v Union of India [2015]13 SCR 1 37. Union of India v V Sriharan[2015] 14 SCR 613 38. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v EMCO Limited and Ors [2016] 1 SCR 857 39.Mukesh and Anr v State for NCT of Delhi and Ors [2017] 6 SCR 1

40. Excel Crop Care Limited v Competition Commission of India and Another [2017] 5 SCR 901 41. Common Cause v. Union of India and Ors. [2017] 13 SCR 361 42. Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Others[2017] 9 SCR 797 43. Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. [2017] 10 SCR 569 44. Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India & Another [2018]6 SCR 1 45. Municipal Corporation, Ujjain & Anr. v. BVG India Limitedand Ors. [2018] 6 SCR 861 46. Shakti Vahiniv. Union of India and Others [2018] 3 SCR 770 47. Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India thr. Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice [2018] 7 SCR 379 48. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [2018] 8 SCR 1 49. Jarnail Singh & Others v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta & Others [2018] 10 SCR 663 50. Joseph Shine v. Union of India [2018] 11 SCR 765 51. Competition Commission of India v. Bharti AirtelLimited and Others[2018] 14 SCR 489 52. Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [2019] 3 SCR 535 53. Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National HighwaysAuthority of India (NHAI) [2019] 7 SCR 522 54. Ashwani Kumar v Union of India and Anr [2019] 12 SCR 30 55. Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd and Ors [2019]16 SCR 1 56.CPIO v SubhashChandra Agarwal [2019]16 SCR 424

57. Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel v Satish Kumar Gupta and Ors [2019] 16 SCR 275 58. Shanti Conductors Pvt Ltd v Assam StateElectricity Board and Ors [2019]16 SCR 252 59. Keisham Meghachandra Singh v The HonbleSpeaker and Ors [2020]2 SCR 132 60.Sushila Aggarwal and Ors v State NCT of Delhi and Anr [2020] 2 SCR 1 61.Dheeraj Mor v High Court of Delhi [2020] 2 SCR 161 62.Internet and MobileAssociation of India v RBI [2020] 2 SCR 297 63.Indore Development Authorityv Manoharlal [2020]3 SCR 1 64. Madras Bar Association v Union of India and Anr [2020] 2 SCR 246 His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala [1973] Supp SCR 1 Facts All six writ petitions involvequestions regarding the validity of the Twenty- fourth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty ninth Amendments of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has previously held that there is an implied limitation on legisl ative power and that the legislature cannotdelegate its essential legislative function The Bribery AmendmentAct, 1958 was not enactedin accordance with the provisi ons contained in sub- section (4) of Section 29 of the Ceylon Constitution Act. The validityof the Consti tution (Twenty-fourth) and (Twenty-

fifth) Amendment Acts of 1971 and the Constitution (Twenty- ninth) Amendment Act of 1972 has been challenged as being outside the scope of t hepower of amendmentconferred on Parliament by Article 368 of the Constitution and consequently void. The Constitution (Twenty- fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 amendedArticle 31 of the Constitution. Issue Whether the amendments made to the Constitution are valid and within the scope o f the power of amendmentconferred on Parliament by Article 368 of the Constituti on. Decision The SupremeCourt declared that section 3 of the Constitution (Twenty- fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 is unconstitutional and invalid. Clause (3) of the 25th Amendment Act which introduced into the Constitution, Article 31- C is invalidfor two reasons:(1) it was beyond the amending powerof the Parliame nt insofar as amendment in question permits destruction of several basic elements or fundamental featuresof the Constitution and (2) it empowersthe Parliament and State Legislatures to pro tanto amend certain human freedoms guaranteed to the ci tizens by the exerciseof their ordinarylegislative power. Clause2(b) of the 25th A mendment Act which incorporated Article 31(2- B) is valid as it did not damage or destroyany essential featuresof the Constitution . The 29th AmendmentAct is valid. Reasoning The SupremeCourt held that the power to amendthe Constitution is in Article368 and that the contention that a constitutional amendment under Article 368 is a law

FACTS: Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and Ors vs State of Kerala Case, 1973, is remembered for introducing the 'basic structure doctrine' to the Indian Supreme Court.The main petitioner of the case, Kesavananda Bharati, passed away on September 6th 2020 at the age of 79 in Idnir Math due to age-related ailments. The case was initiated in response to the Kerala land reforms legislation of 1970, which attempted to impose restrictions on the management of religiously owned property. The petitioner and his team challenged the legislation under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, which grants individuals the right to manage their religiously owned property without government interference. The Supreme Court, enacting its biggest Bench to date with 13 judges, heard the case and gave its landmark judgement, giving rise to the basic structure doctrine. ISSUES: The 24th Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1971 and the 25th Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1972 raise the issue of the extent to which the Parliament can exercise its power to amend the Constitution. Specifically, the question is whether the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution is unlimited, such that it can alter, amend, or abrogate any part of the Constitution, including fundamental rights. RULE:The Keralastate government Land Reforms Amendment Act in 1969. Article 25: Right to practice & propagate religion Article 26: Right to manage religiousaffairs Article 14: Right to equality Article 19(1)(f): Freedom to acquire property Article31: Compulsory acquisition of property

ANALYSIS: Arguments on behalf of Petitioners: The Petitioners argue that the 24th and 25th Constitutional Amendments are in violation of the Fundamental Right provided in Article 19(1)(f). The Parliament does not have the power to amend the Constitution in any manner it wishes,as the power to do so is limited. The Parliament cannot make an amendment to the Constitution to change its basic structure as was set forth by Justice Mudholkar in the Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan case. Therefore, the 24th and 25th Constitutional Amendments should be declared unconstitutional. Arguments on behalf of Respondents: The Respondents argue that the Parliament has boundless power to amendthe Constitution. The Parliament’s supremacy is the Indian legal system’s basic structure and in order to fulfil its socio-economic obligations, the unlimited power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution must be upheld. The 24th and 25th Constitutional Amendments are within the scope of the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution and should therefore be upheld. Conclusion The Supreme Court held that any provision of the Indian Constitution can be amended by the Parliament in order to fulfil its socio-economic obligations, provided that such amendments do not change the Constitution’s basic structure. The court also held that the 24th Constitutional Amendment was entirely valid but the first part of the 25th Constitutional Amendment was intra vires and the second part of the same was ultra vires. Additionally, the court established the doctrine of basic structure which states that the Parliament has the power to amend the Constitution but such amendments should not change the Constitution’s basic structure.

within the meaningof Article 13 must be rejected. The Court also rejected the theo ry of implied limitations on the power of amendment. The Court found that section 3 of the Constitution (Twenty- fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 is unconstitutional and invalid becauseit permits dest ruction of several basic elements or fundamental features of the Constitution. The Court also found that clause (3) of the 25th Amendment Act which empowers the Parliament and State Legislatures to pro tanto amend certainhuman freedoms guar anteed to the citizensby the exercise of their ordinary legislative power is invalidf or the same reason. However, clause 2(b) of the 25th Amendment Act which incor porated Article 31(2- B) is valid as it did not damage or destroyany essential featuresof the Constitution . The Court also held that the 29th Amendment Act is valid. Maneka Gandhiv Union of India [1978]2 SCR 621 Facts The petitioner holds a passportissued on June 1, 1976, under the Passports Act, 19 67. On July 4, 1977, the petitioner received a letter from the Regional PassportOffi cer, Delhi, stating that the Government of India has decided to impound her passpo rt under Section10(3)(c) of the Act in public interestand requiring her to surrender the passport within seven days. The petitioner requested a copy of the statement of reasons for the order, but the Government declined to furnish it, stating that it was

not in the interests of the generalpublic to do so. The petitioner filed a petitionchal lenging the impounding of her passport and the denial of reasons. The impugned Act confers unguidedand unfettered power on the Passport Authorit y to impound a passport, which is violative of the equality clause contained in Arti cle 14. The impugned Order was made in contravention of the rule of natural justic e embodiedin the maxim audi alterampartem and was, therefore, null and void. Th e impugned Order impounding the passport of the petitioner on the basis of a mere opinion by the Central Government was, in the circumstances, clearly unreasonabl e and hence violative of Articles 19(1)(a) and (g). Issues ● Whether the impounding of the petitioner's passport and the denial of reason s violate her fundamental rights? ● Whether Section10(3)(c) of the Passports Act, 1967, is violative of Article 1 4? ● Whether the rule of audi alterampartem applies to the impounding of a pass port? ● Whether the Passports Act complies with the requirements of Article 21 of t he Constitution? Arguments The petitioner arguedthat the impounding of her passportand the denial of reasons violate her fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and (g). The impugned Act confers unguidedand unfettered poweron the Passport Authority to impound a pas sport, which is violative of the equalityclause contained in Article 14. The impugn

ed Order was made in contravention of the rule of naturaljustice embodied in the maxim audi alteram partem and was, therefore, null and void. The respondent arguedthat the impounding of the petitioner's passport was in publi c interest and was a reasonable restriction on her fundamental rights. Section 10(3) (c) of the Passports Act, 1967, providessufficient guidelines for the impounding of a passport and is not violative of Article 14. The rule of audi alteram partem does not apply to the impounding of a passport,as it would stultify the power of impoun ding and paralyse the administration of the law. Analysis The impounding of a passportis subject to judicial reviewon the ground that the or der is mala fide or that the reasons for making the order are extraneous or have no r elevance to the interests of the generalpublic. The power conferred on the Passport Authority to impound a passport under Section 10(3)(c) is not violative of Article 14, as sufficient guidelines are provided by the words "in the interests of the genera l public." The rule of audi alteram partem applies to the impounding of a passport, and the person affected must have a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Pa ssports Act complies with the requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution and is in accordance with the procedure established by law. Conclusion The impugned Order was unreasonable and violative of Articles 19(1)(a)and (g), a nd the rule of audi alteram partem applies to the impounding of a passport. The im pugned Act is not violative of Article 14, and the Passports Act complies with the r equirements of Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court disposed of the writ petiti on without passing any formal order.

MINERVA MILLS LTD. AND OTHERS V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Facts In Kesavananda Bharati,the Supreme Court of India held that while Parliament has the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, it cannot exercise that pow er in a way that damages the basic features or structure of the Constitution. The qu estion in this group of petitions under Article 32 is whether Sections 4 and 55 of th e Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 transgress that limitation on the amen ding power. The petitioners challenge the constitutional validity of certain provisio ns of the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act and of the Order dated O ctober 19, 1971. The challenge to the validity of Sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Am endment rests on the ratio of the majority judgment in Kesavananda Bharati. Issues ● Whether Sections4 and 55 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 transgress the limitation on the amending power under Article 368? ● Whether the amendments introduced by Sections 4 and 55 of the Constitutio n (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 damage the basic structure of the Constituti on by destroying any of its basic features or essential elements? ● Whether clause (5) of Article368 is unconstitutional and void? ● Whether the amendedArticle 31-C is constitutionally valid? Decision

The Supreme Court held that clause (5) of Article 368 is unconstitutional and void as it purports to remove all limitations on the amending power, while clause (4) de prives the courts of their powerto call in question any amendment of the Constituti on. The court found that this would damage the basic structure of the Constitution, which includesthe limited amendingpower of Parliament and the power ofjudicia l review. The court also held that the amended Article 31- C is constitutional and valid as it does not damageor destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. The court declared Section 55 of the Constitution (Forty- second Amendment) Act, 1976 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it dam ages the basic structure of the Constitution and goes beyondthe amending powero f Parliament. However, the court held that Section 4 of the Constitution (Forty- second Amendment) Act, 1976 is constitutional and valid. Sharad BirdhiChand Sarda v State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88 Facts: Manju was founddead and both the High Court and the trial court rejectedthe theo ry of suicide and found that Manju was murdered by her husband by administering her a strong dose of potassiumcyanide. The plea of the appellant was that Manju w as not administered potassium cyanide by himbut she appears to have committed s uicide out of sheer frustration. The High Court has mentioned as many as 17 circu mstances in order to prove that the circumstantial evidence produced by the prosec ution was complete and conclusive. Circumstances must have some proximate relat

ion to the actual occurrence. The prosecution cannotderive any strengthfrom a fal se plea unless it has proved its case with absolute certainty. Issues: 1. Whetherthe prosecution has fulfilled the essential requirements of a crimina l case which rests purely on circumstantial evidence? 2. Whetherthe oral evidenceand letters of witnesses are admissible under s.32( 1) of the Evidence Act? 3. Whetherthe Doctor has tampered with material evidencein the case of alleg ed murder? 4. Whetherthe guilt of the accusedhas been provedbeyond all reasonable dou bt? Analysis: The High Court has completely misread and misconstrued the decisionin Ramgop al's case. The prosecution has not fulfilled the essential requirements of a criminal case whichrests purely on circumstantial evidence.The oral evidenceof witnesses and lettersare inadmissible under s.32(1) of the EvidenceAct. The Doctorhas tam pered with material evidence in the case of alleged murder. The guilt of the accuse d has not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Conclusion: In view of the fact that this is a case of circumstantial evidence and further in view ofthe fact that two views are possibleon the evidence on record,one pointing to th e guilt of the accused and the other his innocence, the accused is entitled to have th

e benefit of one which is favourable to him. In that view of the matter, the guilt of t he accused has not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. A R Antulay v R S Nayak and Anr [1988]Supp 1 SCR 1 Facts The appellant, Abdul Rehman Antulay, was the Chief Minister of Maharashtra fro m 1980 to 1982. He resigned from his office but continued to be a member of the MaharashtraLegislative Assembly. The High Courtof Bombay ordereda speedy tr ialof Antulay for an offence that it had no jurisdiction to try under the Criminal La w Amendment Act, 1952. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and stayed f urther proceedings in the High Court. Issues 1. Whether the directions given by the Court on 16-2- 1984, as reportedin R.S Nayak v. A.R Antulay 1984 2 SCC 183, 243 were l egally proper. 2. Whetherthe action and the trial proceedings pursuantto those directions are legal and valid. 3. Can those directions be recalled or set aside or annulledin these proceedings in the manner sought for by the appellant? Decision The SupremeCourt held that the directions given by the High Court for the speedy trial of Antulay were unwarranted, unprecedented, and not warranted. The Court al

so held thatthe High Court had no jurisdiction to transfer the case to itself. The Co urt further held that the appellant had a right to be dealt with in accordance with th e law and not in derogation of it. The Court quashedand set aside the conclusions r eached by the High Court and allowed the appeal. Reasoning The Court held that the jurisdiction of courts comes solely from the law of the land and cannot be exercised otherwise. The Court also held that an act of the court sho uld not injure any of the suitors.The Court furtherheld that the power of theSupre me Court to transfer cases can be traced, in criminal matters, either to Article 139- A of the Constitution or Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure(CrPC), 19 73. The Court held that the continued trial before the High Court infringed Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court concluded that an accused,tried directly by the H igh Court by withdrawal of his case from a subordinate court, has a right of appeal to the Supreme Court under section 374 of the CrPC. KIHOTO HOLLOHANV. ZACHILLHU AND OTHERS Facts The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution was introduced by the Constitution (Fifty- second Amendment) Act, 1985. The constitutional validity of this amendment was challenged on various grounds.In 1991, the court made an orderupholding the con stitutional validity of the amendment and the provisions of the Tenth Schedule, exc

ept for Paragraph 7 which was declared invalid for want of ratification in terms of and as requiredby the proviso to Article368(2) of the Constitution. The court set o ut its conclusions in the order and indicated that the reasonsfor the conclusions wo uld follow later. It was argued that the TenthSchedule created a non- justiciable constitutional area dealing with certain complexpolitical issues which h ave no strict adjudicatory disposition. Respondents supported the constitutionality of the Amendment. Issues ● Whether the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution is constitutional? ● Whether Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Scheduleis unconstitutional for want of r atification? ● Whether the remaining part of the Tenth Scheduleminus Paragraph 7 is also unconstitutional for violation of basic features of the Constitution? Rule The amending powerunder Article 368 is subjectto the substantive limitation in th at the basic structure cannot be alteredor the basic features of the Constitution dest royed. The court can examine whether the action of the authority under challenge i s ultra vires the powersconferred on the said authority. An ouster clauseconfines j udicial reviewin respect of actions fallingoutside the jurisdiction of the authority t aking such action but precludes challenge to such action on the ground of an error committed in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in the authority becausesuch an ac tion cannot be said to be an action without jurisdiction.

Analysis The court held that Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule was unconstitutional for wa nt of ratification. The entire TenthSchedule was constitutionally invalid in the abse nce of prior ratification in accordance with the proviso to clause (2) of Article 368. The remaining part of the Tenth Schedule minus Paragraph 7 was also unconstituti onal for violation of a basic feature of the Constitution. The court concluded that th e entire Tenth Schedule was, therefore, constitutionally invalid rendering the Const itution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985 still- born and an abortive attemptto amend the Constitution. Conclusion The court held that the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution was unconstitutional an d that the Doctrine of Severability did not apply in the present case of a constitutio nal amendment which suffered from the defect of absence of ratification as require d by the proviso to clause (2) of Article368. The court did not express its conclude d opinion on the other grounds of challenge to the constitutional validity of the enti re Tenth Schedule urged at the hearingon the basis of allegedviolation of certaino ther basic featuresof the Constitution including the right of members based on Arti cle 105 of the Constitution. Indra Sawhneyand Ors v Union of India and Ors [1992] Supp 2 SCR 454 Facts:

The case dealt with the constitutionality of reservations in public employment and education for socially and educationally backward classes of citizens in India. The petitioners challenged the validity of certain government orders that provided for reservation of seats in universities and government jobs for backward classes. The petitioners argued that such reservations violatedthe principles of equality and non- discrimination enshrined in the Indian Constitution. Issues: ● Whether the principle of ‘equality of status and of opportunity’ to be equally provided to all the citizens of India from cradle to grave is satisfactorily consummated? ● Whether the clarion of ‘equality of opportunity in matters of public employment’ enshrinedin Article 16(4)of the Constitution of India has been called into action? ● Whether 10% reservationinfavour of ‘other economically backward sections’ is permissible under Article 16? ● Whether the use of the expression, ‘Nothing in this article shall prevent the State’ in Article 16(4) empowers the State to make reservation under Article 16(4) on race, religion or caste? ● Whether the 50% rule enunciated in Balaji is a binding rule or only a rule of caution or rule of prudence? Arguments: The petitioners argued that reservations based on caste violated the principles of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in the Indian Constitution. They also argued that the reservations were not based on any scientific or objective criteria and

were therefore arbitrary and unconstitutional. The respondents argued that the reservations were necessary to address historical discrimination against certain communities and to promote social justice and equality. Holdings: ● The principleof ‘equality of status and of opportunity’ to be equallyprovided to all the citizens of India from cradle to grave is not satisfactorily consummated. ● The clarion of ‘equality of opportunity in matters of public employment’ enshrined in Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India has not been called into action. ● The reservation of 10% of the posts in favour of ‘other economically backward sections of the people who are not covered by any of the existing schemes of the reservation’ made in the impugned OfficeMemorandum dated September 25, 1991 is constitutionally invalidand is accordingly struck down. ● The use of the expression, ‘Nothing in this article shall prevent the State’ in Article 16(4) cannot be read as empowering the State to make reservation under Article 16(4) on race, religion or caste. ● The 50% rule enunciated in Balaji is a rule of prudenceand not a binding rule. Reasoning: The court held that while reservations were necessary to address historical discriminationagainst certain communities, they should not be based solely on caste. The court also held that reservations shouldbe confined to initial appointments and should not be extended to promotions. The court further held that the percentage of reservation should not exceed 50%. The court also held that the use of the

expression, ‘Nothing in this article shall prevent the State’ in Article 16(4) did not empower the State to make reservation under Article 16(4) on race, religion or caste. The court also held that the 50% rule enunciated in Balaji was a rule of prudence and not a binding rule. Disposition: The reservation of 10% of the posts in favour of ‘other economically backward sections of the people who are not covered by any of the existing schemes of the reservation’ made in the impugned Office Memorandum dated September 25, 1991 was struck down as constitutionally invalid. Clause (i) of the Office Memorandum dated September 25, 1991 was held to be valid subject to a distinction between backward and more backward classeson the basis of degreesof social backwardness and a rational and equitable distribution of the benefits of the reservations amongst them. Clause (ii) of the Office Memorandum datedSeptember 25, 1991 was held to be invalid and inoperative. The writ petitionsand transferred cases were disposedof in the light of the principles, directions, clarifications and orders contained in this Judgment. S R Bommai and Ors v Union of India and Ors [1994]2 SCR 644 Facts The Indian Constitution allows the President to issue Proclamations under Article 3 56(1) in exceptional circumstances where the Government of the State cannot be c arried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The power is condi

tioned andnot absolute, and is subject to judicial review. The use of this power has been a topic of debate and controversy, with concerns over its frequent use and pot ential for abuse. Issues 1. Whatis the scope of judicialreview of the Presidential Proclamation under Article 356? 2. Can the exerciseof the power under Article356 be limited to rectifying a 'fai lure of the constitutional machinery in the State'? 3. What is the nature and scope of the power of judicialreview in administrativ e law and constitutional law? 4. Can a political party's manifesto be inconsistent with the fundamental featur es of the Constitution? 5. Can an appeal to the electorates on the groundsof religion offend secular de mocracy? 6. What is the effect of parliamentary approvalon judicial review? 7. Can the power under Article356 be exercised in a mala fide manner? 8. What is the duration of the operationof the Proclamation issued by the Presi dent under Article 356? 9. What is the obligation cast upon the Centre in situations of breakdown of the constitutional machinery in States? Analysis The Indian Constitution is both a legal and social document. The use of the power under Article 356 must be limited to rectifying a 'failure of the constitutional machi

nery in the State',and the exercise of the power should be subjectto judicial review . The nature and scope of the power of judicial review differs in administrative law and constitutional law. A political party's manifesto should be consistent with the f undamental features of the Constitution, and an appeal to the electorates on the gro unds of religion can offend seculardemocracy. Parliamentary approvaldoes not aff ect the normal operation of judicial review. The exercise of the power under Articl e 356 can be limited by the conditionprecedent that the President shouldbe satisfie d that a situation has arisen where the Government of the State cannot be carried o n in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The duration of the operati on of the Proclamation issued by the President is limited to a period of two months from the date of issue of such Proclamation. The obligation cast upon the Centre in situations of breakdown of the constitutional machinery in States is to take over th e Government of the State. Conclusion The exercise of the power under Article 356 is a constitutional exercise of the pow er, but shouldbe limited to rectifying a 'failure of the constitutional machinery in th e State'. The power is conditioned and subject to judicial review. A political party's manifesto should be consistent with the fundamental features of the Constitution, a nd an appeal to the electorates on the grounds of religion can offend secular democ racy. Parliamentary approval does not affect the normal operation of judicial revie w. The obligation cast upon the Centre in situations of breakdown of the constituti onal machinery in States is to take over the Government of the State.

L ChandraKumar v Union of Indiaand Ors [1994] Supp 6 SCR 261 Overview The present batch of matters before the court owe their origin to separate decisions of different High Courts and severalprovisions in differentenactments which have been made the subject of challenge. Between them, they raise several distinct ques tions of law; they have, however, been grouped together as all of them involve the consideration of the following broad issues: ● Whether the power conferred upon Parliament or the State Legislatures, as t he case may be, by sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of Article 323-A or by sub- clause (d) of clause (3) of Article 323- B of the Constitution, to totally exclude the jurisdiction of ?all courts?, exce pt that of the SupremeCourt under Article136, in respect of disputesand co mplaints referred to in clause (1) of Article 323- A or with regard to all or any of the mattersspecified in clause(2) of Article 323- B, runs counterto the power of judicialreview conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the C onstitution? ● Whether the Tribunals, constituted either under Article 323- A or under Article 323- B of the Constitution, possessthe competence to test the constitutional validi ty of a statutory provision/rule?

Facts In pursuance of the power conferred upon it by clause (1) of Article323- A of the Constitution, Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 ( Act 13 of 1985) (hereinafter referred to as ?the Act?).Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal, with five Benches, was established o n 1-11- 1985. The Act contains 37 sections which are housed in five Chapters. The Court t ook the view that most of the original groundsof challenge did not surviveand rest ricted its focus to testing only the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Ac t. The Courtcame to the conclusion that the Act, as it stood at that time, didnot me asure up to the requirements of an effective substitute and, to that end, suggested se veralamendments to the provisions governingthe form and content of the Tribunal . Issues Whether the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and in the Suprem e Court under Articles 226/227and 32 is part of the basic structure of the Constitut ion. Analysis The Judgesof the superior courts have been entrustedwith the task of upholdingth e Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. Ordina rily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitu tional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. If the power under Article 32 of the Constitution, which has been described as the ?heart?and ?soul?

of the Constitution, can be additionally conferred upon ?any other court?,there is n o reason why the same situation cannot subsist in respect of the jurisdiction conferr ed upon the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. So long as the juris diction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and that of this Court under Arti cle 32 is retained, there is no reason why the power to test the validity of legislatio ns againstthe provisions of the Constitution cannot be conferredupon Administrati ve Tribunals created under the Act or upon Tribunals created under Article 323- B of the Constitution. It, therefore, recommended the trimming of the jurisdiction o f the High Courts by setting up specialist courts/Tribunals while simultaneously eli minating the jurisdiction of the High Courts. Conclusion The Tribunals created under Article323-A and Article323- B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional vali dityof statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunalswill, howeve r, be subject to scrutiny beforea Division Bench of the High Court within whose ju risdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue t o act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approachthe High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (e xcept where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is v alidand constitutional and is to be interpreted in the mannerwe have indicated. All these matters may now be listed before a Division Bench to enable them to be deci 23

ded upon theirindividual facts in the light of the observations contained in this jud gment. Vellore CitizensWelfare Forum v Union of India and Ors [1996]Supp 5 SCR 241 Facts Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum filed a public interest petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India againstthe pollution causedby untreated effluentdischarg ed by tanneries and other industries in Tamil Nadu. The petition stated that agricult ural land in the tanneries belt had becomeunfit for cultivation due to pollutioncaus ed by 170 types of chemicals used in chrometanning processes. The tanneries used 35 litres of water to process one kilogram of finished leather, resulting in toxic effl uents being discharged in the open. The pollution was causing an acute shortage of drinking waterin the affected villages. The Tamil Nadu Pollution ControlBoard ha d been persuading the industries to control pollution for thelast 10 years, but the in dustries had not achieved the required standards. Issues ● Whether the Precautionary Principleand the Polluter Pays Principleare part of the environmental law of India. ● Whether the tanneries and other industries in Tamil Nadu were liable to pay pollution fine and compensate the affected persons. ● Whether the CentralGovernment should take action underthe provisions of the Environment Act to controlpollution and protectthe environment. 24

● Whether a Special Bench "Green Bench" should be constituted to deal with environmental matters. Decision The Supreme Court held that the Precautionary Principle and the Polluter Pays Prin ciple were essential features of "Sustainable Development" and were part of the en vironmental law of India. The tanneries and other industries in Tamil Nadu were li able to pay pollution fine and compensate the affected persons. The Central Gover nment should take immediate action under the provisions of the Environment Act t o control pollution and protect the environment. A Special Bench "Green Bench" s hould be constituted to deal with environmental matters. The State of Tamil Nadu was directed to pay Rs 50,000 towards legal fees and other out of pocket expenses incurred by the petitioner. D K Basu v State of West Bengal [1996] Supp 10 SCR 284 Case No: Writ Petition(Crl.) No. 539 of 1986 Supreme Court of India Facts The ExecutiveChairman, Legal Aid Services, West Bengal, a nonpolitical organisa tion registered under the Societies Registration Act, on 26.08.1986 addressed a lett er to the Chief Justice of India drawing his attention to certain news items publishe d in The Telegraph dated 20-7-1986, 21-7-1986 and 22-7- 25 1986 and in the Statesman and

Indian Expressdated 17-9-1986 regarding deaths in policelock-ups and custody. The Executive Chairmanafter reproducing the news items submitted that it was im perative to examine the issue in depth and to develop ?custody jurisprudence? and formulate modalities for awarding compensation to the victimand/or family memb ersof the victim for atrocities and death causedin police custodyand to provide fo r accountability of the officers concerned. In response to the notice, the State of W est Bengalfiled a counter.The respondents characterised the writ petitionas misco nceived, misleading and untenable in law. Issues ● Whether custodial violence, including tortureand death in lock- ups, violates the rule of law and human dignity? ● Whether compensation can be awardedfor the infringement of fundamental rights? ● Whether the defence of sovereign immunityis available to the State for the t ortious acts of public servants? Decision The Court held that custodialviolence, including tortureand death in lockups, viol ates the rule of law and human dignity. The Court also held that compensation can be awarded for the infringement of fundamental rights. The defence of sovereign i mmunity is not available to the State for the tortious acts of publicservants and for the established violation of the rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court awarded damages against the State to the motherof a young m

an beaten to death in police custody. The amount of compensation as awarded by t he Court and paid by the State to redressthe wrong done may, in a given case, be a djusted against any amount which may be awarded to the claimantby way of dama ges in a civil suit. Reasoning The Court observed that custodial violence, including torture and death in lock- ups, strikes a blow at the rule of law,which demands that the powersof the executi ve should not only be derived from law but also that the same should be limited by law. ?Custodial torture? is a naked violation of human dignity and degradation whi ch destroys, to a very large extent, the individual personality. ?Custodial violence? and abuse of police power is not only peculiar to this country, but it is widespread. The Court also observed that the rights inherent in Articles 21 and (1) of the Consti tution require to be jealously and scrupulously protected. The Court held that for th eviolation of the fundamental right to life or the basic human rights, the defence of sovereign immunity is not available to the State for the tortious acts of public serv ants and for the established violation of the rightsguaranteed by Article21 of the C onstitution of India. Analysis The Court's decision in this case is significant as it recognised the need to examine the issue of custodial violence and develop ?custody jurisprudence? to provide for accountability of officers concernedand compensation to victims and their families . The Court also held that compensation can be awardedfor the infringement of fun damental rights and that the defence of sovereign immunity is not available to the State for the tortious acts of public servants. The Court's decision highlights the im 27

portance of protecting the rights of citizens and ensuring that the State is held acco untable for any violations of these rights. Mafatlal Industries Ltd v Union of India[1996] Supp 10 SCR 585 Issue: Whether the tax paid under mistakeof law can be recoveredunder Section 7 2 of the Indian Contract Act? Rule: Section 72 of the Indian ContractAct, Article 265 and Article19(1)(g) of th e Constitution of India Analysis: In this case, the Court analyzedthe leading decisions in the field and laid down the following propositions with a view to determining the extent to which th e jurisdiction of civil courts can be ousted. The Court referred to the legal position obtaining in England, United States of America and Australia that money paid und er a mistake of lawis not recoverable but observed that so far as India is concerned , Section 72 governs the situation and since the language of the said section is plain and unambiguous, it is not permissible to rely upon the position of law obtaining i n England or othercountries. The Court then referredto the decisions of High Cour ts in India on the meaning and interpretation of Section 72, viz., the decisions of th e Bombay and Madras High Courts in Wolf & Sons v. Dadyba Khimji & Co. ILR 1920 44 Bom 631 and A.M Appavoo Chettiar v. S.I Rly. Co. AIR1929 Mad 177 h olding that money paid under a mistake of law is not recoverable and to the contrar y decision of the Calcutta High Court in Jagadish Prosad Pannalal v. Produce Exch ange Corpn. Ltd. AIR 1946 Cal 245 The Court observed that the said conflict has s ince been resolved by the Privy Councilin Sri Shiba Prasad Singh v. Srish Chandra Nandi 1949 76 IA 244, expressly approving and affirming the view taken by the C 28

alcutta High Court and holding further that the expression ?mistake? in Section 72 should be given its due and natural meaning which means that it takes in both mist akes of fact and law. The Court then dealt with the argumentthat under Section72, monies paid by way of tax could not be recovered and rejected it. Conclusion: The Court held that there can be no distinction in a tax liability and an y other liability on a plain reading of Section 72 and the plea that tax paid by mista ke of law cannot be recovered under Section 72, will not be a proper interpretation of the relevant provisions, but to make a law, adding such words as ?otherwise tha n by way of taxes? after the word ?paid?.The basis in an action for restitution unde r Section 72 of the Contract Act, rests upon the equitable doctrine of unjust enrich ment. The plea urged was that, if the assessee, is denied the refund, the State Gover nment could retain the amount illegally collected, and it would amount to violation of the constitutional mandate enshrined in Article 265 of the Constitution. An equi table principle will not hold good against a constitutional mandate. Vishaka and Ors v State of Rajasthan and Ors [1997] Supp 3 SCR 404 Facts: 1. A writ petitionhas been filed for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of working women under Articles14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India in view of the prevailing climate in which the violation of these rights is not uncommon. 2. The immediate cause for the filing of this writ petition is an incidentof alleged brutal gang rape of a social worker in a village of Rajasthan. 3. Article 42 of the Constitution also provides for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. 4. There is no reason why international conventions and norms cannot be used

for construing the fundamental rights expressly guaranteed in the Constitution of India which embody the basic concept of gender equality in all spheres of human activity. Issues: 1. Whetherfundamental rights of working womenunder Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India are being violated? 2. Whether the international conventions and norms can be used for construing the fundamental rights expressly guaranteed in the Constitution of India? Held: 1. The present petition has been brought as a class action by certain social activists and NGOs with the aim of focusing attention towards this societal aberration, and assisting in finding suitable methods for realization of the true concept of ‘gender equality’; and to prevent sexual harassment of working women in all workplaces throughjudicial process, to fill the vacuum in existing legislation. 2. The power of this Court under Article 32 for enforcement of the fundamental rights and the executive power of the Union have to meet the challenge to protect the working women from sexual harassment and to make their fundamental rights meaningful. 3. All employers or persons in charge of workplace whether in the public or private sector should take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment. 4. The Complaints Committee should be headed by a woman and not less than half of its membersshould be women.5. Employees should be allowedto raise issuesof sexual harassment at workers' meeting and in other appropriate forum and it should be affirmatively discussedin employer-employee meetings. 6. These guidelines will

be binding and enforceable in law until suitablelegislation is enactedto occupy the field. Githa Hariharan and Anr v Reserve Bank of India and Anr [1999] 1 SCR 669 Plaintiffs: Firstpetitioner and secondpetitioner Summary The first petitioner, who is the wife of the secondpetitioner, filed a writ petitionfor striking down Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (HMG Ac t) and Section 19(b) of the Guardians and Wards Act (GW Act) as violative of Arti cles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The Reserve Bank of India questioned the autho rity of the mother as a naturalguardian of her minor daughter,even when she had a cted with the concurrence of the father,because in its opinion she could functionas a guardian only after the lifetime of the father and not during his lifetime. The Hig h Court recognised the mother to act as the natural guardian and the findings were accepted and approved by the Supreme Court. The Court held that the validity of a legislation is to be presumed and efforts should always be there on the part of the l aw courts in the matter of retention of the legislation in the statute- book rather than scrapping it and it is only in the event of gross violationof constit utional sanctions that law courtswould be withintheir jurisdiction to declare the le gislative enactment to be an invalid piece of legislation and not otherwise. Facts

● The first petitioner is the wife of the second petitioner. ● The first respondent prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. ● The petitioner filed an application for maintenance for herself and the minor son. ● The petitioner filed the writ petition for striking down Section 6(a) of the H MG Act and Section19(b) of the GW Act as violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. ● The ReserveBank of India questioned the authority of the motheras a natura l guardian of her minor daughter, even when she had acted with the concurre nce of the father, because in its opinion she could function as a guardian onl y after the lifetime of the father and not during his lifetime. Issues ● Whether Section6(a) of the HMG Act and Section19(b) of the GW Act are violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution? ● Whether the mother can be considered to be the natural guardianof her mino r daughter? ● Whether the sale by the mother notwithstanding the fact that the father had a ttested the deed,could be held to be a sale by the father and the naturalguard ian, satisfying the requirements of Section 8? ● Whether the Reserve Bank of India ought to accept the application filed by t he mother? Arguments

● The petitioner argued that both the sectionsmust be struck down as unconsti tutional as they undoubtedly violategender equality, one of the basic princip les of the Constitution. ● The ReserveBank of India argued that the mothercould function as a guardi an only after the lifetime of the father and not during his lifetime. ● The plaintiff argued that the sale by the mother notwithstanding the fact that thefather had attestedthe deed, could not be held to be a sale by the fathera nd the natural guardian, satisfying the requirements of Section 8. ● The plaintiff argued that the provisions of Section 6 of the Act seriously disa dvantage womanand discriminate man against woman in the matter of guard ianship rights, responsibilities and authority in relation to their own children. Analysis The Court held that the validity of a legislation is to be presumed and efforts shoul d always be there on the part of the law courts in the matter of retention of the legis lation in the statute- book rather than scrapping it and it is only in the event of gross violation of constit utional sanctions that law courts would be within their jurisdiction to declare the le gislative enactment to be an invalid pieceof legislation and not otherwise. The Cou rt recognised the mother to act as the naturalguardian and held that the word ?after ? in Section6(a) shall have to be read and interpreted in a mannerso as not to defe atthe true intentof the legislature. The Courtheld that the word ?after?cannot run counter to the constitutional safeguards of genderjustice and as such cannotbut be termed to be void and ultra vires the Constitution. Conclusion

The Court dismissed the appeal and directed that the Reserve Bank Authorities are directed to formulateappropriate methodology in the lightof the observations so as to meet the situation as called for in the contextual facts. The matter pending befor e the District Court, Delhi as regards custody and guardianship of the minor child s hall be decided in accordance therewith. There shall, however, be no order as to co sts. Rupa Ashok Hurra v Ashok Hurra and Anr [2002] 2 SCR 1006 Facts: A Bench of three learned Judges referred a writ petition to a Constitution Bench to consider whether a judgment of the Supreme Court could be regarded as a nullity a nd whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution could be maintained to question the validity of a judgment of the Supreme Court after the petition for r eview of the said judgment has been dismissed. The question of whether an aggrie ved person is entitled to any relief against a final judgment/order of this Court, afte r dismissal of review petition, either under Article32 of the Constitution or otherwi se, arose for consideration. The Supreme Court of India is established by Article 12 4 of the Constitution which specifies its jurisdiction and powers and enables Parlia ment to confer furtherjurisdiction and powerson it. In regard to the writ jurisdictio n, the High Courts in India are placed virtually in the same position as the Courts o f King's Bench in England. Issue:

Whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against a finaljudgment/order of this Court, after dismissal of review petition, either under Article 32 of the Cons titution or otherwise. Decision: The Supreme Court, to prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, may reconsider its judgments in exercise of its inherent power. Exceptio ns both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistake s or miscarriage of justice. The plenary powers of the Supreme Court, as envisaged under Article 142, stand out to be complementary to those powers to do complete j ustice between the parties. Manifest injustice is curable in nature rather than incura ble and this Court would lose its sanctity and thus would belie the expectations of t he founding fathers that justice is above all. Curative petitions ought to be treated a s a rarity rather than regularand the appreciation of the Court shall have to be upon proper circumspection having regard to the three basic features of our justice deliv ery system, to wit, the order being in contravention of the doctrine of natural justic e or without jurisdiction or in the event of there being even a likelihood of public c onfidence being shaken by reason of the association or closeness of a Judgewith th e subject-matter in dispute. Reasoning: The corrective power must be exercised so as to correct an injustice in a case of pat entlack of jurisdiction in a narrow sense, not in the Anisminic's broader sense, and gross violation of natural justice. The composition of the Bench might include seni ormost Judges along with the Judges who passed the order, if available. The Supre

me Court is the court of last resort ? the final court on questions both of fact and of law including constitutional law. The law declared by this Court is the law of the la nd; it is precedent for itself and for all the courts/tribunals and authorities in India. It is, therefore, relevantto note that so much was the value attachedto the preceden t of the highest court that in London Street Tramways Co. Ltd. v. London County Council 1898 AC 375 the House of Lords laid down that its decision upon a questi on of law was conclusive and would bind the House in subsequent cases and that a n erroneous decision could be set right only by an Act of Parliament. The law laid down by this Court is binding upon all courtsin the country under Article141 of th e Constitution, and numerous cases all over the country are decided in accordance with the view taken by this Court.It would createuncertainty, instability and confu sion if the law propounded by this Court on the basisof which numerous cases hav e been decided and many transactions have taken place is held to be not the correct law.? Disposition: The writ petitions were referred to a Constitution Bench for consideration. Pradeep Kumar Biswasand Ors v Indian Instituteof Chemical Biologyand Ors [2002] 3 SCR 100 In 1972, Sabhajit Tewary,a Junior Stenographer with the Councilof Scientific and

IndustrialResearch (CSIR), filed a writ petition underArticle 32 of the Constitutio n claiming parity of remuneration with the Stenographers who were newly recruite d to CSIR. His claim was based on Article 14 of the Constitution. A Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court denied him the benefit of that articlebecause they hel d in Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India (1975) 1 SCC 485, 1975 SCC (L&S) 99, (1 975) 3 SCR 616, AIR 1975 SC 1329 that the writ application was not maintainable against CSIR as it was not an ?authority? within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The correctness of the decision is before us for reconsideration. Background The questions beforethe court were whether CSIR is a State withinthe meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and if it is, should this Court reverse a decision whic h has stood for over a quarter of a century? It must be emphasized that the significance of Article 12 lies in the fact that it occu rs in Part III of the Constitution which deals with fundamental rights. Legal Analysis The Court held that a company incorporated under the CompaniesAct is not forme d statutorily and is not subject to any statutory duty vis-à- vis an individual, and hence, it was excludedfrom the purviewof ?State?. The Court affirmedthe decision in Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal AIR 1967 SC 185 7, (1967) 3 SCR 377 and held that the Court could compel compliance of statutory rules.

The Court came to the conclusion that although the employees of the three Corpora tions were not servants of the Union or the State, ?thesestatutory bodies are ?autho rities? within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution?. The contention of the employee was that CSIR is an agency of the Central Govern ment on the basis of the CSIR Rules which, it was argued,showed that the Govern ment controlled the functioning of CSIR in all its aspects. The Court noted that it was the Government whichwas taking the ?special care? ne vertheless the writ petition was dismissed ostensibly because the Court factored int o its decision two premises:(i)?The society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Insurance Corporation or Industr ial Finance Corporation. The Court seemedto hold on the facts that the Council was not an agency of the G overnment and was, therefore, not an ?authority?.? The case itselfdealt with a challenge under Article 32 to admissions made to a coll ege established and administered by a society registered under the Jammu and Kas hmir Registration of Societies Act, 1898. Existenceof deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the cor poration is a State agency or instrumentality. The Court went on to say that where a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it must be held to be an ?authority? for Article 12. The three- Judge Bench in Workmen v. Food Corpn.of India (1985)2 SCC 136, 1985 SCC (

L&S) 420 held the Food Corporation of India to be an instrumentality of the State covered by the expression ?other authority? in Article 12. The tests laid down in Ajay Hasiacase (1981) 1 SCC 722, 1981 SCC (L&S) 258 ar e relevant for the purpose of determining whether an entity is an instrumentality or agency of the State. CSIR does not and cannotmake law. On point of fact we may state that this notification, though of the year 1986, was n ot relied on or referred to in the pleadings of the appellants. Moreover, on the mate rial available, we have recordeda positive findingthat CSIR is not a society ?owne d or controlled by Government?. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the court held that the Council of Scientific and Industri al Research (CSIR) is not the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constit ution. Sabhajit Tewary case (1975) 1 SCC 485, 1975 SCC (L&S) 99, (1975) 3 SC R616, AIR 1975 SC 1329 was correctly decided and must hold the field. The High Court has rightly followed the decision of this Court in Sabhajit Tewary (1975) 1 SCC 485, 1975 SCC (L&S) 99, (1975) 3 SCR 616, AIR 1975 SC 1329.The appeal is liableto be dismissed. P Rama Chandra Rao v State of Karnataka[2002] 3 SCR 60

Case Citation (1999) 7 SCC 604 Facts The State of Karnataka filed an appeal before the High Court against the acquittal of the accused.The High Courtcondoned a delay of 55 days in filing the appeal an d allowed the appeal itself without issuingnotice to the accused.The accused filed an appeal by special leave. The matter was heard by a Constitution Bench. Issues 1. Whetherspeedy trial is an integraland essential part of the fundamental righ t to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India? 2. Whether it is advisable or feasible to fix any time-limit for trial of offences? 3. Whetherbars of limitation, judicially engrafted, can provide a solution to the delay in dispensation of justice in India? 4. Whetherthe directions made in CommonCause cases and Raj Deo Sharma c ases run counterto the Constitution Bench directions in Abdul RehmanAntu lay case? 5. Whetherthe criminal courts are obligedto terminate trialor criminal procee dings merely on account of lapse of time? 6. Whetherthe power to impose costscan be exercised on a case being made o ut of breachof fundamental right conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution ? 7. Whether the judiciary can entrench upon in the field of legislation properly meant for the legislature?

8. Whetherthe Court has the jurisdiction to fix any period of time- limit for trial of offences? Decision The Court held that speedytrial is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and libertyenshrined in Article21 of the Constitution of India. Howev er,it is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescri be an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time- limits or bars of limitation prescribed in Common Cause cases and Raj Deo Sharm a cases could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The crim inal courts should exercise their available powers under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. The Court also held that the power to impose costs can be exercised on a case being made out of breach of fundamental right conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution. The Co urt further held that the judiciary cannot entrench upon in the field of legislation pr operly meant for the legislature. The Court declined the request for fixation of any period of time- limit for trial of offences. The Court allowedthe appeals and set aside the impugne d judgments of the High Court. Reasoning The Court reasoned that speedy trial is an integral and essential part of the fundam ental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. T heCourt further reasonedthat it is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially per missible to draw or prescribe an outer limitfor conclusion of all criminalproceedin

gs. The Court held that the time- limits or bars of limitation prescribed in Common Cause cases and Raj Deo Sharm a cases could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The Cour treasoned that the criminalcourts should exercisetheir available powersunder Sec tions 309, 311 and 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. The Court also reasoned that the power to impose costs can be exercis ed on a case being made out of breach of fundamental right conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court held that the judiciary cannot entrench upon in the f ield of legislation properly meant for the legislature. The Court declined the reques t for fixation of any period of time-limit for trial of offences. Precedent The Court reliedon the precedent set in Abdul RehmanAntulay case, whichheld t hat it is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Disposition The Court allowedthe appeals and set aside the impugnedjudgments of the High Court.

TMA Pai Foundation and Ors v State of Karnataka and Ors [2002]Supp 3 SCR 587 Issue: Whether the minority institutions have the right to admitmembers of the mi nority community and deny admission to others as a result of the exerciseof "their choice" under Article 30(1) of the Constitution; Whether the regulations regarding pay and allowances for teachers and staff would violate Article30; Whether the St ate can lay down reasonable conditions for obtaining grant-in- aid without infringing the constitutional right of the minority educational institutio ns; Whether the right conferred under Article 30(1) is an absolute right;Whether th e decisions of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of Articles 29 and 30 requir e reconsideration; Whether the grant of aid by the State can alter the character of a minority institution, including its choice of the students. Rule: Article 30(1) confers a special right on the minorities to establish and admini ster educational institutions of their choice. The right to admit students is part of th e right to administer an educational institution. The aid, if any, has to be granted to the minority educational institutions without infringing their constitutional right. A ny regulation which is not in the interest of the minority educational institutions bu t is in the interest of an outside agency would whittle down the right ofthe minority to administer the institution and would be violative of Article 30 of the Constitutio n.The minoritybe given preferential rights to admit students of their own communi ty in their own institutions in a reasonable measure otherwise there would be no m eaningful purpose of Article 30 in the Constitution. Analysis: The case involves the interpretation of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitu tion of India, which deal with the rights of minorities to establish and administer ed

ucational institutions of their choice.The Court held that the minority institutions h ave the right to admit members of the minority community and deny admission to others as a result of the exerciseof "their choice" under Article 30(1)of the Constit ution. The regulations regarding pay and allowances for teachers and staff would n ot violate Article30. The State can lay down reasonable conditions for obtaining gr ant-in- aid without infringing the constitutional right of the minority educational institutio ns. The right conferred under Article 30(1) is not an absolute right. The decisions o f the Supreme Courton the interpretation of Articles29 and 30 require reconsiderat ion. The grant of aid by the State cannot alter the character of a minority institution , including its choice of the students. Conclusion: The Court held that the minorityinstitutions have the right to admit m embersof the minority community and deny admission to others as a resultof the e xercise of "their choice" under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The regulations re garding pay and allowances for teachers and staff wouldnot violate Article30. The State can lay down reasonable conditions for obtaining grant-in- aid without infringing the constitutional right of the minority educational institutio ns. The right conferred under Article 30(1) is not an absolute right. The decisions o f the Supreme Courton the interpretation of Articles29 and 30 require reconsiderat ion. The grant of aid by the State cannot alter the character of a minority institution , including its choice of the students. P A Inamdarv State of Karnataka (2004)8 SCC 139

Facts: The petitioner seeks to fill the vacant seats, which remained vacantafter the State h as admitted the candidates who had succeeded in the common entrance test, with o utside candidates who were successful in the examination held by the Association. The dispute is related to the interpretation put by a Bench of five Hon'ble Judgesin Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka 2003 6 SCC 697 on the eleve n- Judge Bench decision in T.M.A Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 2002 8 SCC 481. A writ petitionwas filed by the association of the non- minority unaided professional institutions before the High Court which is still pend ing. The institutions insist that for this academicyear, they shouldbe permitted to a dmit the students on the basis of 50:50 percentage and the fixation of the percentag e at 75:25 in favour of the StateGovernment was wrong and based upon a misreadi ng of Islamic Academy. The State Government, on the other hand, has contended t hat the phrase?their need? refers to the need of the minority or non- minority unaided professional college(s). The commonentrance test, held by the as sociation, must be for admission to all colleges of that type in the State. The claim of the institutions was, however,disputed. As far as IslamicAcademy is concerned , the dispute is still at large. This Court has only made an exception to the rule quot ed earlier in respect of those institutions which had their own admission procedure for the last 25 years. It is the only minoritydental college in the State.The college t henfiled a writ petition beforethe Bombay High Court. This was rejectedand henc e the special leave petition. Issues:

1. Whetherthe institutions should be permittedto admit the students on the bas is of 50:50 percentage and the fixationof the percentage at 75:25 in favouro f the State Government was wrong and based upon a misreading of Islamic Academy? 2. Whether the phrase ?their need? refers to the need of the minority or non- minorityunaided professional college(s) or local needs or the needs of the St ate Government? 3. Whetherthe common entrancetest, held by the association, must be for adm ission to all colleges of that type in the State? 4. Whetherthe decision in Islamic Academyprovides for only two methodsof admission to a college, namely,either through the common entrancetest hel d by the State or by the recognised association? 5. Whether the StateGovernment should recognise MEMCET examination? 6. Whether the quota has been fixed at 70% for the minorityinstitutions and 30 % for open admissions? Arguments: The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has submitted that the decisio n in Islamic Academyas it stands today clearlyprovides for only two methodsof a dmission to a college,namely, either throughthe common entrancetest held by the State or by the recognised association. Pursuant to the interim order the dental coll ege in question has also held separate examination on 20-5- 2004. No admissions to the petitioner college have been made on the basis of CET or the entrance examination held by the non- minority association. The State Government, however, refused to recognise MEM 46

CET examination last year. As at presentthe quota has been fixed at 70% for the m inority institutions and 30% for open admissions. Out of the 70 per cent, 55% has b een allocated to the management i.e 55% for minority students, 15 per cent for man agement quota and 30% for State Government quota. The State Government will b e permitted to fill the 30% quota also out of CET candidates who need not necessar ily belong to the minority community on the basis of merit and according to the ch oice of the candidate. Technip SA v SMS Holding Pvt Ltd and Ors [2005] Supp 1 SCR 223 Smart Summary ● Co-Appellant: Coflexip, also incorporated in France 47

● Shareholder: Institut Francais du Petrol (IFP) throughits subsidiary ISIS, a company incorporated in France Issue: Whether Technip acquired control of seamec through Coflexip in April 2000 or in July 2001 and whether Technipviolated Regulations 10 and 12 of the Securities an d Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Reg ulations, 1997 (the Regulations) by acquiring 58.24% of the shares/voting rights an d control in seamec in July 2001 without making any public offer. Decision: The Supreme Court held that Technip violated Regulations 10 and 12 of the Regul ations by acquiring control of seamecin July 2001 without makingany public offer . The Court also held that the relevant date onwhich the controlof seamec was tak en over by Technip was April 2000. The Court set aside the order of the Securities Appellate Tribunal(SAT) and held that the order of the Securities and Exchange B oard of India (SEBI) must prevail. Facts: Technip, a Frenchcompany, and Coflexip, also a Frenchcompany, were sharehold ers in seamec, an Indian company.The question before the Court was whether Tec hnip acquired control of seamec through Coflexip in April 2000 or in July 2001. If Technip controls Coflexip,then it also controls seamec.The Court found that Tech nip had obtained control of Coflexip in July 2001 and had violated Regulations 10 and 12 of the Regulations by acquiring 58.24%of the shares/voting rights and cont rol in seamec in July 2001 withoutmaking any publicoffer. The Tribunalheld that

the applicable law to the question as to when control of seamec had been taken ov er by Technip was Indian law. The Tribunal affirmed SEBI's conclusion that the R egulations had been violated by Technip by its failureto make a public announcem ent but decided that the relevantdate on which the controlof seamec was taken ove rby Technip was April 2000. The rate of interestwas also challenged. A separate a ppeal was preferred by IFP from the decision of the Tribunal. Reasoning: The Courtheld that French law must be applied to decide whether Technip took ov er the control of Coflexip in April 2000 or July 2001. The Court also held that dom estic public policy which can justify a disregard of the applicable foreign law must relate to basic principles of morality and justice and the foreign law must amount t o a flagrant or gross breach of such principles. The Court found that Technip violat ed Regulations 10 and 12 of the Regulations by acquiring controlof seamec in July 2001 without making any public offer. The Court set aside the order of the SAT an d held that the order of SEBI must prevail. Conclusion: The appealswere allowed withoutcosts. SBP and Co v Patel Engineering Ltd and Anr [2005] Supp 4 SCR 688 Facts The question before the court was thenature of the function of the Chief Justice or hisdesignate under Section11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The t

hree- Judge Bench decisionin Konkan Rly. Corpn. Ltd. v. Mehul Construction Co. (200 0) 7SCC 201 had taken the view that it is purely an administrative function, that it is neither judicial nor quasi- judicial and the Chief Justiceor his nominee performing the function underSection 11(6) of the Act cannot decide any contentious issue between the parties. The corr ectness of the said view was questioned in these appeals. Issues ● What is the nature of the function of the Chief Justice or his designate under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996? ● Can the Chief Justiceof the High Court designatea District Judge to perfor m the functions under Section 11(6) of the Act? ● Is the order passed by the ChiefJustice under sub- section (6) of Section11 of the Act administrative or judicial? ● Is a writ petitionunder Article 226 of the Constitution maintainable against t he order passed by the Chief Justice under sub- section (6) of Section11 of the Act? Rules ● The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ● The Indian Arbitration Act, 1859 ● The Second Scheduleto the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ● The Limitation Act, 1963 ● Article 11 of the Model Law 50

● Article 136 of the Constitution ● Article 226 of the Constitution ● Section 16 of the Act ● The ?duty to act judicially? ● The ?acting fairly?doctrine Analysis The court held that the power under Section 11(6) of the Act is not conferred on th e Supreme Court or on the High Court, but it is conferred on the Chief Justice of In dia or the Chief Justice of the High Court. Therefore, the fact that the power is conf erred on the Chief Justice, and not on the court presided over by him is not sufficie nt to hold that the power thus conferred is merely an administrative power and is n ot a judicial power. The court furtherheld that the order passedby the Chief Justice or his designateun der sub- section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is administrative in nature and can be challenge d before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The courtalso held that the doctrineof ?duty to act fairly? appliesand the Chief Ju stice must issue noticeto the person or personslikely to be affected by the decision under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act. Conclusion The court held that the function of the Chief Justice or his designate under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is administrative in nature and can be challenged beforethe High Court under Article226 of the Constitution. The co 51

urt also held that the Chief Justicemust issue noticeto the person or personslikely to be affected by the decision under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act. Rameshwar Prasadand Ors v Union of India and Anr [2006] 1 SCR 562 Facts: The present Constitution Bench is not about reconsidering the Supreme Court judgment in Bommai (S.R Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 3 SCC 1) but about the legal principles laid down in Bommaiand their application to the facts of the present case. It is necessary to interpret a Supreme Court judgment in the context of the question under consideration and not to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment divorced from the context of the question. The authority to determine the question of disqualification is vested exclusively in a high constitutional functionary viz. the Speaker. There is no power in the Governorto thwart the staking of the claim assubmitted by the learned SolicitorGeneral. The contention that the merger has to be agreed to by two-thirds of members of the original political party is totally misconceived and would make the provisions of Tenth Schedule unworkable. No rule has yet been issued, and therefore, the question of prima facie satisfaction has not been established. Judicial review is not barred in respect of the exercise of powers under Article 356. The only ground on which the exercise of power under Article 356 can be tested is founded on the theory of ultra vires. The German Constitutional Court has proposedreconciliation through structural interpretation. A

constitutional provision itself may be null and void. Not less than two-thirds of the members of the legislative party of the original party which has merged must have agreed to such merger.It shows that there was a splitin the party, and the leadership was not in favour of the merger. The challenge in these petitions is to the constitutional validity of the notification dated 23-5-2005 orderingdissolution of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Bihar. The immunity grantedunder Article 361 doesnot mean that in the absence of the Governor, the grounds of mala fide or being ultra vires would not be examined by the Court. Issues: ● Whether the power exercised by the Governor is legislative in character and can only be nullified on the ground of ultra vires? ● Whether the proclamation dated 23-5-2005 is unconstitutional? ● Whether the Court can question the “satisfaction” of the President under Article 356 and Article 74(2) of the Constitution? ● Whether the Governorhas the power to thwartthe staking of the claim? ● Whether the merger has to be agreed to by two-thirds of members of the original political party? ● Whether the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Bihar is constitutional? ● Whether the immunity grantedunder Article 361 means that in the absence of the Governor, the grounds of mala fide or being ultra vires would not be examined by the Court? Analysis:

The power exercised by the Governor is legislative in character and can only be nullified on the ground of ultra vires. The proclamation dated 23-5-2005 is unconstitutional. The Court cannotquestion the “satisfaction” of the President under Article 356 and Article 74(2) of the Constitution. The Governor does not have the power to thwart the staking of the claim. The merger does not have to be agreed to by two-thirds of members of the original political party. The dissolution of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Bihar is unconstitutional. The immunity granted under Article 361 does not mean that in the absence of the Governor,the grounds of mala fide or being ultra vires would not be examined by the Court. Conclusion: For all the aforesaid reasons, the writ petitions are without any merit and they are liable to be dismissed. IR CoelhoDead by LRs v State of Tamil Nadu [2007]1 SCR 706 Facts: The words ?nor any of the provisions thereof? (i.e of the Acts and regulations speci fied in the Ninth Schedule)?shall be deemedto be void or ever to have become voi d? were on account of important historic circumstances. Article 31- A had sufficient guidelines and did not excludejudicial review of the courts(which enforced fundamental rights). Part III itself is undoubtedly a basic feature of the C onstitution. Bill 88 of 1978, titled the Constitution (Forty-

fifth Amendment) Bill, 1978 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 15-5- 1978. Clause 45 (amendment of Article 368) p=270 to 281 of Debates ?That clause 45 stands part of the Bill.? The Bill as amended was thus passed by the Lok Sabha on 7-12-1978. Article 31- B has now become totally otiose and cannot be invoked by Parliament to make voi d laws valid (void becausethey infringe all or any of the rights mentioned in Part II I). It is not governed by Article 31-A. Issue: Whether a constitutional amendment which incorporates a legislation in the Ninth Schedule has to be testedon the ground whether such legislation or its provisions v iolate the basic structure of the Constitution. Decision: The power to amend the Ninth Scheduleflows from the power to amend the Consti tution from Article 368. Therefore, Section 14 of the General Clauses Act would cl early apply.It was generally argued that Article 14 is one of the basic featuresof th e Constitution and hence any constitutional amendment violative of Article 14 is e qually violative of the basic structure. Twelve out of the thirteen Judges proceeded on the basis that it was too late in the day to challenge the validity of Article 31- B having regardto the various decisions of the SupremeCourt upholding Article3 1- B. Therefore, in the absenceof the amendment being specified in the Ninth Schedu le the amendment cannot be protected for infringement of the rights under Part III of the Constitution. Therefore, a constitutional amendment which incorporates a le

gislation in the Ninth Schedulehas to be tested on the ground whether it violates th e basic structure of the Constitution. Reasoning: Article 31- B is a constitutional mechanismfor validating statuteswhich have been struck dow n on the ground of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Article 31- B creates a sphere whereby legislation or regulation provided in the Ninth Schedul e would not attract the application of Part III of the Constitution. Therefore, a const itutional amendment which incorporates a legislation in the Ninth Schedule has to be testedon the ground whether such legislation or its provisions violate the basic s tructure of the Constitution. It is therefore submitted that mere curtailment of a fun damental right might not offend the basic structure of the Constitution. The majorit y in Bhim Singhji case did not strike down Section 21(1)on the basis of violation o f a particular fundamental right like Article 14 of the Constitution. Fundamental rig hts are not unamendable and they have been expresslyheld to be amendable. Articl e 31- B is a constitutional device or mechanismfor validating statuteswhich have been s truck down on the groundthat they infringePart III of the Constitution. Article 31- B itself cures the defect which takes ?place with retrospective operation from the d ates on which the Acts were put on the statute- book?. Thus it is settled law that validating legislation can be passed prospectively, or retrospectively to remove the basis of the judgment. Disposition:

The petitions/appeals be now placed for hearingbefore a three- Judge Bench for decisionin accordance with the principles laid down herein. Common Cause v Union of India and Ors [2008] 6 SCR 262 Facts A society registered under the Societies Registration Act filed a writ petition under Article32 of the Constitution, alleginga rising numberof road accidents in India and defects in the licensing procedure and training of drivers. The petitioner sought various directions to ensure road safety, including the formulation of a suitableRoad Traffic Safety Act. The High Court directed the Union of India to take necessary steps for road safety, but the Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the court cannot direct legislation. Issues Whether public interest litigation has gone beyond its intended purpose and become an illegitimate exercise of judicial power. Whether the court can direct the legislature to enact a particular law.

Whether the court can perform executive functions or abdicate its function by handing over its powers to a person or committee appointed by it. Whether the courtcan give directions for road safety that essentially belong to the executive or legislature. Decision The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition and held that the court cannot direct legislation or perform executive functions. While judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive, the only check on the court's own exercise of power is the self-imposed discipline of judicial restraint. The court must not embarrass the administrative authorities and must realise that administrative authorities have expertise in the field of administration while the courtdoes not. The court cannot occupy a buffer zone unoccupied by the legislature or executive which is detrimental to the publicinterest, but each case has to be examined on its own facts. The court cautioned that public interest litigation is a weapon to be used with great care and circumspection, and that frivolous PILs flood the dockets of most superior courts. Reasoning The court observed that public interestlitigation was conceived and created as a judicial tool by the courts in India to help the poor, weaker and oppressed

sections of society who could not approach the court due to their poverty. However, over the years, public interest litigation has grown and become something strange and bizarre that those who had created it probably would be shocked to know what it has become. The court noted that the judiciary cannot solve all the problemsof the people, despite its best intentions, and that the view that the judiciary can run the government and can solve all the problems of the peopleis fallacious and unconstitutional. The court emphasised that the judiciary, legislature and executive have to function within their own spheres demarcated under the Constitution and that the court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The court held that the High Court's direction to the Union of India to formulate a suitable Road Traffic Safety Act was a clear and naked usurpation of legislative power,and that the court cannotdirect the legislature to enact a particular law. Significance This case highlights the limits of judicial power and the need for judicial restraint in public interest litigation. The court cautioned that the judiciary cannot solve all the problems of the people,and that the view that the judiciary can run the government and can solve all the problems of the peopleis fallacious and unconstitutional. The court emphasised that the judiciary, legislature and executive have to function within their own spheres demarcated under the Constitution, and that the court cannot directlegislation or perform executive 59

functions. The courtalso cautioned that public interestlitigation is a weapon to be used with great care and circumspection, and that frivolous PILs flood the dockets of most superior courts Selvi and Ors v State of Karnataka [2010]5 SCR 381 Legal Questions Do the involuntary administration of scientific techniques, such as narcoanalysis, polygraph examination, and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test, violate the "right against self-incrimination" in criminal cases, as guaranteed by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and Section 161(2)of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)? Facts The presentcase involves criminalappeals related to the involuntary administration of scientific techniques, namely, narcoanalysis, polygraph examination, and the BEAP test, for the purposeof improving investigation efforts in criminalcases. The use of polygraph examinations in the criminal justice system has been contentious. The admissibility of scientific evidence was governed by the standard of "general acceptance in the particular field" for several decades.However, in Daubertcase 125 L Ed 2d 469, 509 US 579 (1993),it was held that the trial court shouldevaluate the scientific evidenceas per Rule 702 of the FederalRules of Evidencewhich mandates an inquiry into the relevance and reliability of the scientific technique in question. 60

The Ninth Circuit Court remanded the case back after finding that the trial Judge should have adopted the parameters enumerated in Daubert to decide on the admissibility of the polygraph test results. In that case, an eight-Judge majority decided that the Military Rule of Evidence, §707, which made polygraph results inadmissible in court-martial proceedings, did not violatean accused person'sSixth Amendment right to present a defense. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the results of a polygraph examination are not admissible as evidence. Statements made in a hypnotic state were held to be not voluntary and hence they cannot be admittedas evidence (Horvathv.R. (1979) 44 CCC 2d 385, (1979) 2 SCR 376 (Can SC)). The compulsory administration of the impugned techniques violates the "right against self-incrimination". Issues Whether the involuntary administration of scientific techniques, such as narcoanalysis,polygraph examination, and the BEAP test, violatethe "right against self-incrimination" in criminal cases, as guaranteed by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and Section 161(2) of the Code of CriminalProcedure (CrPC)? Decision

The compulsory administration of the impugned techniques violates the "right against self-incrimination". Reasoning The protective scope of Article20(3) read with Section 161(2) CrPC guardsagainst the compulsory extraction of oral testimony, even at the stage of investigation. The law provides for some restrictions on "personal liberty" in the routine exercise of police powers. The compulsory administration of the impugned techniques violates the "right againstself-incrimination". If the accused volunteers for a lie detector test, he should be given access to a lawyer, and the physical, emotional, and legal implications of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer. The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention, including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation. A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record. Disposition The Court held that the compulsory administration of the impugned techniques violates the "right against self-incrimination". Re SpecialReference No 1 of 2012 [2012] 9 SCR 311 Facts:

The President of Indiamade a reference under Article143(1) of the Constitution of India on 12-4- 2012. The reference concerned the issuanceof cellular mobiletelephone services li censes (CMTS licenses) by the Department of Telecommunications, Government o f India (GoI) in 1994 and 1997- 1998, and the subsequent issuanceof CMTS licensesand basic telecomservices lic enses in 2001. The reference also addressed the allocation of spectrum in the releva nt 2G bands and the validity of the reference itself. Issues: 1. Is the Referencemade by the President underArticle 143(1) of the Constituti on of India valid? 2. Is auction the only constitutionally recognized method for alienation of natur al resources? 3. Can the State exclude eligiblepersons from lodgingcompeting claims for all otment of land or grant of other forms of largesse? Decision: The Court held that the Reference made by the President under Article143(1) of th e Constitution of India was valid. The Court also held that auction is not the only c onstitutionally recognized methodfor alienation of natural resources and that the St ate cannot exclude eligible personsfrom lodging competingclaims for allotmentof land or grant of other forms of largesse. The Court further held that there cannot b e a dissipation of material resources free of cost or at a consideration lower than th eir actual worth.

Reasoning: The Court held that the President of India has the power to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court under Article 143(1)of the Constitution of India,and that the Court has the power to evaluate and clarify the ratio of the judgment in the 2G case. The Court also held that while auction is a more preferable method of alienation/allotm ent of naturalresources, it cannotbe held to be a constitutional requirement or limit ation for alienation of all natural resources. The Court further held that the State ca nnot exclude eligible persons from lodging competing claims for allotment of land or grant of other forms oflargesse, and that there cannotbe a dissipation of materia l resources free of cost or at a consideration lower than their actual worth. Republic of Italy and Ors v Union of India and Ors [2013] 4 SCR 595 Facts The Special Leave Petition was filed by the two marines challenging the dismissal of their Writ Petition No. 4542 of 2012 by the Kerala High Court rejecting their pr ayer for quashingof FIR No. 2 of 2012 on the file of the Circle Inspectorof Police, Neendakara, Kollam District, Kerala, as being without jurisdiction. The Writ Petiti on (Civil)No. 135 of 2012 was alsofiled for much the same reliefs. Both the matte rswere, therefore, taken up togetherfor hearing and were disposedof together on 1 8th January, 2013.

Issues ● Whether the State of Kerala had jurisdiction to investigate into the incident? ● Whether the provisions of Article. 100 of UNCLOS,1982, applied to the fac ts of this case? ● Who has the jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation and trial of the Pet itioner Nos. 2 and 3 in the Writ Petition? ● What steps shouldbe taken in the matter? ● Whether the investigations will be completedat an early date and the trial wi ll also be conducted on a day-to- day basis and be completed expeditiously as well? Decision While disposing of the two matters, the Court held that the State of Kerala had no j urisdiction to investigate into the incident and that till such time it is proved that th e provisions of Article. 100 of UNCLOS, 1982, applied to the facts of this case, it i s the Union of India whichalone has the jurisdiction to proceed with the investigati on and trial of the Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 in the Writ Petition. If there is any jurisdi ctional error on the part of the Central Government in this regard, it will always be open to the accused to question the same before the appropriate forum. The Court t ook note of thesteps taken by the Central Government pursuant to the directions gi ven in their judgment dated 18th January,2013, and left it to the CentralGovernme nt to take further steps in the matter. In addition to the above, the Court sincerely h oped that the investigations will be completedat an early date and the trial will also be conducted on a day-to-day basis and be completed expeditiously as well.

Novartis AG v Union of India and Ors [2013] 13 SCR 148 Issues: ● Whether Novartis is entitled to a patent for Gleevec on the grounds of lack o f (i) novelty and (ii) inventivestep and by virtue of fulfilling (iii) Section 3(d ) of the Act? Facts: Novartis filed a patent application for the beta form of Imatinib Mesylate, a drug us edto treat chronicmyeloid leukemia. The Indian patentoffice rejected the applicati on on the grounds that the beta form was not a new invention and did not exhibit si gnificant enhancement of efficacy. Novartis appealed the decision, arguing that the beta form was a novel invention and should be granted a patent. The case raised is sues related to Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, which was designed to preve nt evergreening and encourage incremental inventions. Ruling: The court ruled that the beta form of ImatinibMesylate was not a new invention an d did not exhibit significant enhancement of efficacy. The court held that Novartis was estopped from raising an objection that the beta form was not a novel inventio n. The court also held that Section3(d) of the Indian PatentsAct was designedto p revent evergreening and encourage incremental inventions. The court rejected Nov

artis' argument that the beta form was a novel invention and should be granted a pa tent. Reasoning: The court reasoned that the beta form of Imatinib Mesylate was not a new inventio n and did not exhibitsignificant enhancement of efficacy. The court also reasoned t hat Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act was designed to prevent evergreening an d encourage incremental inventions. The court rejected Novartis' argument that the beta form was a novel inventionand should be granted a patent. The court held that Novartis was estopped from raising an objection that the beta form was not a nove l invention. Analysis: The court analyzed the provisions of the Indian Patents Act and the legislative hist ory of Section 3(d) to determine whether the beta form of Imatinib Mesylate was a new invention. The court also considered the objective of Section 3(d) to prevent e vergreening and encourage incremental inventions. The court held that the beta for m was not a new inventionand did not exhibit significant enhancement of efficacy. The court also held that Novartis was estopped from raising an objection that the b eta form was not a novel invention. Dr BalramPrasad v Dr Kunal Saha and Ors [2013] 12 SCR 30

Smart Summary Civil AppealNos. 2867, 731, 858, 692 and 2866 of 2012 Background: The appeal was filed againstthe judgment and order dated 21.10.2011 passed by th e National ConsumerDisputes Redressal Commission (National Commission) in O riginal Petition No. 240 of 1999. The appellant- doctors were aggrieved by the quantumof compensation awardedand the liability fastened upon them for negligence. The appellant- AMRI Hospital questioned the quantum of compensation awarded.The claimant w as aggrieved by the compensation awarded, which he deemed inadequate. Facts: ● The claimantsought enhancement of compensation at Rs. 78,14,00,000/- un der the heads of pecuniary damages and non-pecuniary damages. ● The appellant- doctors and the AMRI Hospital found the compensation to be excessive. ● The claimantclaimed that the income of the deceasedwas $30,000 per annu m, which was not substantiated by producing cogent evidence. ● The NationalCommission granted Rs. 10 lakhs under the head of ?loss of co nsortium?, which the appellant-doctors found to be erroneous. ● The appellant- doctors contended that multiplier method should be used while awarding co mpensation to the victims to ensure consistency and avoid arbitrariness.

● The NationalCommission failed to grant any interest on the compensation d espite the case taking more than 15 years to determine and award compensat ion. ● The claimant contended that a doctor cannot escape liability for causing deat h of a patientfrom medical negligence on the groundthat he did not charge a ny fee. ● The claimant soughtUS $ 1,000,000 as punitivedamages. ● The NationalCommission equated Dr. Sukumar Mukherjeewith Dr. Balram Prasad who was the attending physician, which was found to be erroneous. Legal Issues: ● Whether the enhanced claim of the claimant in his appealis maintainable in l aw? ● Whether the compensation claimedby the claimant is an enormously fabulo us amount? ● Whether the National Commission erred in apportioning the liability on the Hospital? ● Whether the National Commission failed to grant any intereston the compen sation? ● Whether the compensation claimedby the claimant is contraryto the legal pr inciples laid down by the Court? ● Whether the National Commission erred in rejectingthe entire claim solely o n the ground that the additional claim was not pleaded earlier?

● Whether the National Commission correctly calculated the entire compensati on and prospective loss of incomesolely based on a pay receipt of the victim ? ● Whether the claimant is entitled to enhanced compensation under the headin g of loss of future prospects of income of the victim? ● Whether the National Commission correctly deducted 10% from the total co mpensation on account of contributory negligence? ● Whether the National Commission failed to take into consideration the legal and substantial evidence produced on record regardingthe income of the dec eased? ● Whether the courts shouldaward damages solelyon the basis of pecuniary l oss to family due to the demise of the wife? ● Whether the compensation claimed by the claimant is excessive? ● Whether the decision will act as a deterrent to those doctors,Hospitals, the N ursing Homes and other connected establishments who do not take their resp onsibility seriously? Ruling: The Civil Appeal No. 692/2012filed by the appellant- AMRI Hospital is dismissed and it is liableto pay compensation as awarded in this judgment in favour of the claimant after deducting the amount fastened upon the d octors in this judgmentwith interest @ 6% per annum. The Civil AppealNo. 2866/ 2012 filed by the claimant- Dr. Kunal Saha is partly allowedand the findingon contributory negligence by the National Commission on the part of the claimant is set aside. The direction of the National Commission to deduct 10% of the awarded amountof compensation on a 70

ccount of contributory negligence is also set aside by enhancing the compensation from Rs. 1,34,66,000/- to Rs. 6,08,00,550/- with 6% interestper annum from the d ate of the complaint to the date of the payment to the claimant. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee and Dr. Baidyanath Haldar are liableto pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 10 lakhs each and Dr. Balram Prasad is held liable to pay compe nsation of Rs. 5 lakhs to the claimant. The AMRI Hospitalis directed to comply wi th this judgment by sending demand draft of the compensation awarded in this app eal to the extent of liabilityimposed on it after deductingthe amount, if any, alread y paid to the claimant, within eight weeks and submit the compliance report. The decision will act as a deterrent and a reminder to those doctors, Hospitals, the Nursing Homes and other connectedestablishments who do not take their responsi bility seriously. Lalita Kumari v Govt of UP and Ors [2013] 14 SCR 713 Supreme Court of India, 12 November 2013 Facts Lalita Kumari, a minor, was kidnapped and her father filed a written report with th e policeon 11 May 2008. The officer in charge of the police station did not take an y actionon the report. A writ petition was filed underArticle 32 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus or direction(s) of like nature against the respondents for the protection of Lalita Kumari. 71 Issues

Whether a police officer is bound to register a first information report (FIR) upon r eceiving any information relatingto commission of a cognizable offence under Sec tion 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the police officer has the pow er to conduct a ?preliminary inquiry? in order to test the veracity of such informati on before registering the same? Ruling The Supreme Court held that the registration of an FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence a nd no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. The Court also directe d that all information relatingto cognizable offences,whether resulting in registrati on of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary of the police station. Reasoning The Court interpreted Section 154(1) of the Code strictly and gave the word ?shall? its natural meaning, holding that it is mandatory to register an FIR if the informati on given to the policediscloses the commission of a cognizable offence. The Court also held that the officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to regist er a case and then to proceedwith the investigation if he has reason to suspect the c ommission of an offence which he is empowered under section 156 of the code to i nvestigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157. The Courtrejected the contention that a preliminary inquiry is necessary before the registration of an FIR, holding that it would reduce the registration of FIR to a me chanical act. The Court also held that the right of the accusedunder Article 21 of th

e Constitution is protected if the FIR is registered first and then the investigation is conducted in accordance with the provisions of law. The Court directed that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether res ulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meti culously reflectedin the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary of the police stati on. The Court also directed that the fact of delay in registering an FIR and the caus es of it must be reflected in the diary entry. Impact The ruling in this case has clarified the law on the registration of FIRs and has emp hasized the importance of maintaining accuraterecords of all information relatingt o cognizable offences.The ruling has also providedguidance on the procedure to b e followed by the police in investigating cognizable offences. National Legal Services Authorityv Union of India and Ors [2014]5 SCR 119 Facts The petitioner, Laxmi Narayan Tripathy, a hijra, filed a petition seekinga legal dec laration of her gender identityas female, ratherthan the male gender assignedto he r at birth. She argued that the non- recognition of her gender identity violatedher fundamental rightsguaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner also sought legal rec

ognition of the hijra communityas a third gender with all legal and constitutional p rotections. The petitioner highlighted the discrimination and trauma facedby the transgender c ommunity in India, including socialexclusion, harassment, and violence. The petiti oner also noted the historical and cultural significance of hijras in India, as well as the discrimination faced by the community under colonial-era legislation. Issues ● Does the non- recognition of gender identity of the transgender community violate their fun damental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of I ndia? ● Is the recognition of a third gender necessary to protect the rights of the trans gender community? ● Is discrimination on the basis of sexualorientation or genderidentity a violat ion of the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India? ● Do Articles15 and 16 of the Constitution of India prohibitdiscrimination on the basis of gender identity? ● Does the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a)of the Constitution of India include the right to express one's self- identified gender? ● Is self- determination of gender an integral part of personal autonomy and self- expression and falls within the realm of personal libertyguaranteed under Ar ticle 21 of the Constitution of India?

Decision The Supreme Court of India held that the non- recognitionof the identity of hijras/transgenders as a third gender violatedtheir fun damental rightsguaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. T he Court recognized the right of transgender individuals to self- identify their genderand held that gender identityis an integral part of sex, and no citizen can be discriminated on the groundof gender identity, including those who identify as third gender. The Court also held that discrimination on the basis of sexualorientation or gender identity impairs the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India were interpreted to prohibit discrimi nation on the basis of gender identity. The Court further held that the right to freed om of speech and expression underArticle 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India inc ludes the right to express one's self-identified gender. The Court recognized the historical and cultural significance of hijras in India and noted the discrimination faced by the community under colonial- era legislation. The Court directed the government to take measures to ameliorate t heproblems faced by the transgender community, based on the recommendations o f an expert committee. Reasoning The Court held that the right to self- determination of gender is an integral part of personal autonomy and self- expression and falls within the realm of personal libertyguaranteed under Article2

1 of the Constitution of India. The Court recognized the discrimination facedby th e transgender community and held that the non- recognition of their gender identityviolated their fundamental rights guaranteed un der Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted that discrimination on the basis of sexualorientation or genderide ntity impairs the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Court interpreted Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India to prohibit discri mination on the basis of gender identity, recognizing that sex discrimination includ es discrimination on the basis of gender identity. The Court also recognized the historical and cultural significance of hijras in India and noted the discrimination faced by the community under colonial- era legislation. The Court directed the government to take measures to ameliorate t heproblems faced by the transgender community, based on the recommendations o f an expert committee. Impact The decision in Laxmi Narayan Tripathy v. Union of India & Ors. was a landmark ruling in India,recognizing the rights of transgender individuals and the need for le gal recognition of a third gender. The decision has had significant impact on the tra nsgender community in India, leadingto greater awarenessand recognition of their rights. The decision has also influenced other countries in the region to recognize t he rights of transgender individuals and to providelegal recognition of a third gend er.

Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust and Ors v Union of India and Ors [2014] 11 SCR 712 Issue: Whether Article 15(5) and Article21- A of the Constitution of India are violative of the basic features of the Constitution ? Decision: The Court upheld the validity of the 24th Amendment but held that Artic le 15(5) and Article 21-A cannot damage the basic structure of the Constitution. Facts: ● The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of Article15(5) and Arti cle 21-A of the Constitution of India. ● The petitioner argued that Article 15(5) and Article 21- A are violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. ● The respondent argued that Article15(5) and Article21- A are valid as they are part of the Constitution. Reasoning: ● The Court held that Article 15(5) permits reservations to be made by law, in contrast to Article 15(4) whichdoes not require?law? but an executive order by the State is sufficient. Thus, Article 15(5) is valid. ● The Court held that Article21- A is also valid as it providesfor the right to educationwhich is a fundamenta l right.

● The Court held that the principle of secularism is part of the basicstructure o f the Constitution and cannot be overturned. Thus, any law that violates secu larism is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. ● The Court held that Articles14, 19 and 21 form part of the ?GoldenTriangle ? basic structurerights comprising the equality and freedom codes. ● The Court held that the right to establishan educational institution does not c arry with it the right to recognition or right to affiliation. ● The Court held that minority educational institutions have a right to admit st udents from their community with a reasonable percentage of non- minority students. ● The Court held that the Preambleis a part of the basic structure of the Consti tution. ● The Court held that the only test for determining the validity of Article 15(5) is whether it is violative of the basic features of the Constitution and whethe r it damages the basic structure of the Constitution. Conclusion: The Court held that Article 15(5) and Article21- A are valid but cannot damagethe basic structureof the Constitution. Kailash Nath Associates v Delhi Development Authority and Anr[2015] 1SCR 627

Background As per the terms and conditions of the auction,the appellant, being the highestbid der, deposited a sum of Rs 78,00,000 (Rupees seventy- eight lakhs), being 25% of the bid amount, with DDA, this being earnestmoney un der the terms of the conditions of auction. The relevant provisions in the conditions of auction read as follows:?(ii) The highe st bidder shall, at the fall of the hammer, pay to the Delhi Development Authority t hrough the officer conducting the auction, 25% of the bid amount as earnestmoney either in cash or by bank draft in favour of the Delhi Development Authority, or c heque guaranteed by a scheduled bank as ?good for payment for three months? in f avour of the Delhi Development Authority. If the earnestmoney is not paid, the auction held in respectof that plot will be canc elled. Several letters had been writtenby the appellant to DDA from 1984 to 1987 but no answer was forthcoming from DDA. The CentralGovernment informed DDA vide a Letter dated1-3- 1990 that the land auctioned to the appellantwas not nazul land and, therefore, the Central Government would have nothing further to do with the matter. By a judgmentand order dated2-9- 19931, the Delhi High Court held that as the auction was held as per the terms and conditions of the auction,a dispute regardingthe same is a matterof contract and c annot be gone into in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 79

The learnedSingle Judge by a judgmentand order dated10-9- 20073 dismissed the appellant's suit for specificperformance and damagesbut orde red refund of the earnest money forfeited together with 9% per annum interest. Issue Whether the forfeiture of earnest money by DDA was in order. Ruling The Division Bench set aside5the judgment of the Single Judge holdingthat the fo rfeiture of the earnest money by DDA was in order.Further, since DDA sold the pl ot for Rs 11.78 crores (Rupees eleven crores seventy- eight lakhs), there was no loss causedto DDA and, hence forfeiture of earnest mon ey would not be in accordance with the agreement or in accordance with law. Reasoning Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872 awards reasonable compensation for damage or loss caused by a breach of contract. Damage or loss caused is a sine qua non for the applicability of the section.Section 74 will apply to cases of forfeiture of earne st money under a contract. The Division Bench has gone wrong in principle. In cas es where a public auction is held, forfeiture of earnest money may take place even before an agreement is reached, as DDA is to accept the bid only after the earnest money is paid. In such cases, Section 74 may not be attracted on its plain language because it appliesonly ?when a contract has been broken?.In the present case, forf eiture of earnest money took place long after an agreement had been reached. 80 Conclusion

The appealis allowed. Shreya Singhalv Union of India [2015]5 SCR 963 Facts: Section 66- A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (the said Act) was challenged by the p etitioner on the ground that it violates the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a)of the Constitution. The petitioner ar gued that the said sectionhas a chilling effect on freedom of speech and expression and is thus violative of Article 19(1)(a). The petitioner further contended that the e ntire Section 66- A is unconstitutional. The respondent defendedthe constitutionality of Section 66- A. Issues: ● Whether Section 66- A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is unconstitutional? ● Whether Section 69- A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is unconstitutional? ● Whether the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011 are valid? ● Whether Section 118(d)of the Kerala Police Act is unconstitutional?

Arguments: ● The petitioner arguedthat Section 66- A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 violates the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article19(1)(a) of the C onstitution. The petitioner contended that the said sectionhas a chilling effec t on freedom of speech and expression and is thus violative of Article 19(1)( a). The petitioner further argued that the entire Section 66- A is unconstitutional. ● The petitioner also challenged the constitutionality of Section 69- A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. ● The petitioner assailed the validityof the Information Technology (Intermed iary Guidelines) Rules, 2011. ● The petitioner contended that Section118(d) of the Kerala PoliceAct is unc onstitutional. ● The respondent defended the constitutionality of Section 66- A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Decision: The Hon'bleCourt held that Section 66- A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is unconstitutional as it violates the fu ndamental rights of freedomof speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)( a) of the Constitution. The Court also held that Section 69- A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is constitutional subjectto certain cond itions. The Court further held that the Information Technology (Intermediary Guid

elines) Rules, 2011 are valid subject to certain conditions. The Court struckdown Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act as unconstitutional. Reasoning: The Court held that Section 66- A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 violates the fundamental rights of free dom of speechand expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a)of the Constitution as it has a chilling effect on freedom of speech and expression. The Court further hel d that the entire Section 66- A is unconstitutional. The Court also held that Section 69- A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is constitutional subject to the conditio n that an intermediary upon receiving actualknowledge from a court order or on be ing notified by the appropriate government or its agency that unlawful acts relatabl e to Article 19(2) are going to be committed then fails to expeditiously remove or d isableaccess to such material. The Court held that the Information Technology (Int ermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011 are valid subject to the condition that Rule 3 su b- rule (4) is read down in the same manneras indicated in the judgment. The Court st ruckdown Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act as unconstitutional as it violates the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) and is not saved by Article 19(2). Supreme Court AOR Association and Anr v Union of India [2015]13 SCR 1 Facts

The function of rendering ‘advice’relating to appointment of Judges underArticles 124(2) and 217(1) of the Constitution is confined to the judicial functionaries and excluded from the scope of advice rendered by the Council of Ministers under Article 74(1) of the Constitution. The seniority in the matterof appointment of Chief Justice of India is the unwritten rule of Article 124(2). The Governor cannot discharge his function under Article 233 if he makes an appointment of a person without ascertaining the High Court's views in regard thereto. The appointments to the subordinate judiciary must be made by the Governor in consultation with or on the recommendation of the High Court as provided by Article 233 of the Constitution. Issues Whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India is entitled to have the right of primacy in the matter of selection of Judges to the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts? Whether the word ‘consultation’ should be construed to mean ‘concurrence’ in Articles 124(2), 217(1) and 222(1) of the Constitution? Whether the appointments to the judicialoffices are made after consultation with the constitutional functionaries named in the relevant provisions? Arguments The plea of the State of Nagaland is for the primacy to the opinion of CJI and also appointment of a National Judicial Commission. The existing constitutional protective conditions attached to the judicial office are more than sufficient to

preserve the independence of the judiciary. The Governor's power of appointment is conditioned by the obligation to consult the High Court and such consultation must be meaningful and purposive and cannot be reduced to an empty formality. Appointment of retiredjudges can be made under Article 224-Aby the Chief Justice of the High Court with the consent of the President. The restructuring of the court system is an encouraging part of the reform of the justice delivery system. The qualifications for appointment as a Judge of the High Court have been specified in clause (2) of Article 217. The power conferred on the Chief Justice of India by Articles 127 and 128 is circumscribed by the requirement of previous consentof the President. The need for periodical revision of the Judge-strength is essentially to ensure early disposal of court cases;the entire exercisewould be meaningless if the existing vacancies and the new ones created by increase in the Judge-strength are not filledin promptly. The primary role of conventions is to regulatethe exercise of discretion. The executive is bound by the advice/recommendation of the Chief Justice of India in the process of consultation under Articles 124(2) and 217(1) of the Constitution. Conclusion The opinion of the Chief Justice of India is entitled to have the right of primacy in the matter of selection of Judges to the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts. The word ‘consultation’ should not be construed to mean ‘concurrence’ in Articles 124(2), 217(1) and 222(1) of the Constitution. The appointments to the judicial offices are made after consultation with the constitutional functionaries named in the relevant provisions. The executive is bound by the advice/recommendation of the

Chief Justice of India in the processof consultation under Articles 124(2)and 217(1) of the Constitution. Union of India v V Sriharan[2015] 14 SCR 613 Facts The impugned letter was issued by the State of Tamil Nadu, which led to the filing of the writ petition. The learned Judges referred seven questions for consideration bythe Constitution Bench in the judgment reportedas Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2014) 11 SCC 1, (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 1. Articles72, 73, 161, and 162 of the Constitutionwere also relevantto the case. Issue Whether the exercise of power of remission under Section 432(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code is permissible, and if so, what is the procedure for exercising such power? Decision The Court held that suo motu exercise of power of remission under Section 432(1) of the CriminalProcedure Code is not permissible, and exercise of power under Section 432(1) must be in accordancewith the procedureunder Section 432(2) of

the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court also recommended a legislative clarification that life imprisonment must always mean imprisonment for ?the entire natural life of the convict?. Reasoning The Court referred to Articles 72, 73, 161, and 162 of the Constitution, which delineatethe extent of Executive Powersof the Union and the State. The Court also noted that the power to grant pardon and to suspend, remit, or commute sentences are conferred by Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution upon the President and the Governor. The Court held that the power of remission cannotbe exercised arbitrarily and must be exercised in accordance with established principles. The Court also noted that the appropriate Government under Sections 432 and 433 of the Criminal Procedure Code may, in the case of sentences of death, also be exercised by the Central Government. However, the Court held that the offencein question is within the exclusive domain of the State Government and it is the Executive Power of the State which must extend to such offence. The Court rejected the argument that the States will continue to exercise their power of remission and commutation in the absence of a specific law pertaining to the exercise of such power. The Court also overruled the opinionexpressed by the Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC 452, (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611 that the deprival of remission power of the appropriate Government by awarding sentences of 20 or 25 years or without any remission as not permissible is not in consonance with the law. The Court held that the highest Executive Power prescribed under the Constitution in Articles 72 and 161 remains untouched for grant of pardon, suspend, remit, reprieve, or commute any sentence awarded.

A question arosewhether the tarifffixed under a Power PurchaseAgreement (PPA) was inviolable and beyond review by the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC). The Regulatory Commission did not conferon itself the power to review and correct the tariff under the Electricity Act, 2003. The Appellate Tribunalheld that the SERC had the power to reviewthe tariff. The power producer applied to the SERC for a redetermination of the tariff. The Biomass Energy Developers Association sought revision of the biomass fuel cost and the tariff. The review petition was dismissed by the State Commission. The Appellate Tribunal overruled the view taken by the State Regulatory Commission. The tariff approved by the State Regulatory Commission and incorporated in the PPA would remain in force for the agreed period and cannotbe altered unilaterally. Issues Whether the tariff fixed under a PPA was inviolable and beyond review by the SERC. Ruling The Court held that the power to regulate the price of sale and purchase of electricity between the generating companies and distribution licensees through agreements for

power produced for distribution and supply did not necessarily include the power to prohibit. The Court leaned in favour of flexibility and did not read inviolability in terms of the PPA insofar as the tariff stipulated therein as approved by the Commission was concerned. The Court held that a PPA duly entered into and otherwise consistent with the tariff order of the State Regulatory Commission could not be reopened. The Court dismissedthe appeals and affirmed the orders of the AppellateTribunal. Reasoning Section 86(1)(b) of the Electricity Act, 2003 empowers the State Commission to regulate the price of sale and purchase of electricity between the generating companies and distribution licensees through agreements for power produced for distribution and supply. The power to regulate does not necessarily include the power to prohibit, and ordinarily the word "regulate" is not synonymous with the word "prohibit". Sections 61, 62, 64, and 86 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Regulations 23 and 31 of the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (multi-year tariff) Regulations, 2016 were considered. Sections 14 and 21 of the GeneralClauses Act, 1898 were also considered. The Court held that a PPA duly entered into and otherwise consistent with the tariff order of the State Regulatory Commission could not be reopened. The Court held that a quarry lease, mining lease or other mineral concession in respectof a minor mineral did not stand on the same footingas an ordinary contract.

The Court held that the power to amend the rules made under Section 15(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003 was comprehended within the power to make the rules conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 15. The Court held that the power producer would not be relieved of its contractual obligations under the PPA. Conclusion The Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the orders of the Appellate Tribunal. The parties were left to bear their own costs. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limitedv EMCO Limited and Ors [2016] 1 SCR 857 Facts A question arosewhether the tarifffixed under a Power PurchaseAgreement (PPA) was inviolable and beyond review by the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC). The Regulatory Commission did not conferon itself the power to review and correct the tariff under the Electricity Act, 2003. The Appellate Tribunalheld that the SERC had the power to reviewthe tariff. The power producer applied to the SERC for a redetermination of the tariff. The Biomass Energy Developers Association sought revision of the biomass fuel cost and the tariff. The review petition was dismissed by the State Commission. The Appellate Tribunal overruled the view taken by the State Regulatory Commission.

The tariff approved by the State Regulatory Commission and incorporated in the PPA would remain in force for the agreed period and cannotbe altered unilaterally. Issues Whether the tariff fixed under a PPA was inviolable and beyond review by the SERC. Ruling The Court held that the power to regulate the price of sale and purchase of electricity between the generating companies and distribution licensees through agreements for powerproduced for distribution and supply did not necessarily include the power to prohibit. The Court leaned in favour of flexibility and did not read inviolability in terms of the PPA insofar as the tariff stipulated therein as approved by the Commission was concerned. The Court held that a PPA duly entered into and otherwise consistent with the tariff order of the State Regulatory Commission could not be reopened. The Court dismissedthe appeals and affirmed the orders of the AppellateTribunal. Reasoning Section 86(1)(b) of the Electricity Act, 2003 empowers the State Commission to regulate the price of sale and purchase of electricity between the generating companies and distribution licensees through agreements for power produced for distribution and supply. The power to regulate does not necessarily include the power to prohibit, and ordinarily the word "regulate" is not synonymous with the word "prohibit".

Sections 61, 62, 64, and 86 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Regulations 23 and 31 of the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (multi-year tariff) Regulations, 2016 were considered. Sections 14 and 21 of the General ClausesAct, 1898 were also considered. The Court held that a PPA duly entered into and otherwise consistent with the tariff order of the State Regulatory Commission could not be reopened. The Court held that a quarry lease, mining lease or other mineral concession in respectof a minor mineral did not stand on the same footingas an ordinary contract. The Court held that the power to amend the rules made under Section 15(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003 was comprehended within the power to make the rules conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 15. The Court held that the power producer would not be relieved of its contractual obligations under the PPA. Conclusion The Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the orders of the Appellate Tribunal. The parties were left to bear their own costs. Mukesh and Anr v State for NCT of Delhi and Ors [2017]6 SCR 1 Review Petition under Article 137 of the Constitution of India filed by Petitioner to review the final judgment dated 05.05.2017 passedby this Court by which Criminal Appeal No. 607 of 2017 has been dismissed.

Facts: The petitioner was one of the accused in the horrific incident which took place on 16.12.2012 in Delhi wherein a young lady of twenty three years (Nirbhaya, a changed name) was gang raped and brutally injured who subsequently died. The petitioner was convicted and awarded death sentence by Additional Sessions Judge (Special Fast Track Court) Saket Court Complex New Delhi. Delhi High Court confirmed the death reference and dismissed the criminal appeal filed by the petitioner challenging his conviction and sentence. Issues: Whether the review petition filed by the petitioner under Article 137 of the Constitution of India discloses any ground, on which review jurisdiction can be exercised by the Supreme Court? Ruling: The Supreme Court rejected the review petition filed by the petitioner as it did not disclose any ground, on which review jurisdiction can be exercised by the Court under Article 137 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supremecourt Rules, 2013. Reasoning: The power of review of the Supreme Court as envisaged under Article 137 of the Constitution is wider than review jurisdiction conferred by other statutes on the

Court. The substantive power is derivedfrom Article 137 and is as wide for criminal as for civil proceedings. However, review in a criminal proceeding is permissible only on the groundof error apparenton the face of the record. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. The power to review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases. The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. The power of review can be exercised only when a glaring omission or patent mistake has crept in the earlier decision due to judicial fallibility. There has to be an error apparent on the face of the record leading to miscarriage of justice to exercise the review jurisdiction under Article 137 read with Order 40 Rule 1. Analysis: The Court has reiterated the scope and limitations of the power of review under Article 137 of the Constitution of India. It has emphasized that the power of review can be exercised only in exceptional cases and when there is a glaring omission or patent mistakeleading to miscarriage of justice. The Court has also clarified that the power of review cannotbe used to re-argue old and overruled arguments or to raise new grounds which were not raised earlier. Excel Crop Care Limited v Competition Commission of India and Another [2017]5 SCR 901 Facts:

A request was made to the CCI alleging anti-competitive agreement amongst the manufacturers of ALP tablets leadingto rise in the cost of procurement. The Director General (DG) found that the four manufacturers used to quote identical rates for contracts awarded by government agenciesfor ALP tablets,except for the year 2007. The appellants were found guilty of contravening the provisions of Section 3(3)(d) of the Competition Act and violating Section 3(3)(b) of the Act by indulging in collusive bidding. A minority judgment by Shri R. Prasad agreed with the majority but for different reasons and did not find the appellants guilty of violating Section 3(3)(b). Issues: Whether the appellants violatedthe provisions of Section 3(3)(d)of the Competition Act? Whether the appellants violated the provisions of Section 3(3)(b) of the Act? Whether the Director General had jurisdiction to investigate the tender floated in 2011? Whether the penalties imposedby the CCI were proportionate? Arguments: The appellants arguedthat the Competition Act is not retrospective in operation and therefore, only the facts after May 20, 2009, when Section 3 and 4 were notified could be considered. They also arguedthat the DirectorGeneral had no jurisdiction to investigate the tender floatedin 2011. The learned counselfor the appellants

argued that the penalties imposed by the CCI were not proportionate to the wrong done and would lead to the closure of the unit manufacturing ALP. Decision: The CCI found the appellants guilty of contravening the provisions of Section 3(3)(d) of the Competition Act and violatingSection 3(3)(b) of the Act by indulging in collusive bidding. The minority judgment by Shri R. Prasad agreed with the majority but for different reasons and did not find the appellants guilty of violating Section 3(3)(b). The Court held that the Director General had jurisdiction to investigate the tender floated in 2011. The penalties imposed by the CCI were modified to be proportionate to the wrong done. The Court confirmedthe finding by theCCI in respect of breachof the provisions of the Competition Act and dismissed the appeals. Common Cause v. Union of India and Ors. [2017] 13 SCR 361 Facts: These writ petitions were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. The hearing revealed a massive mining scandal involving lessees in the districts of Keonjhar, Sundergarh, and Mayurbhanj in Odisha. The lessees minediron ore and manganese ore, causing environmental destruction and harm to the tribalsin the area. While they took steps to ameliorate the situation, it was not enough.

Issues: Whether forest area approved under the FC Act should be equal to the total forest area included in mining leases approved under the MMDR Act? Whether mining leaseholders in Orissa should be directed to pay the NPV for the entire forest area included in mining leases? Whether mining operations in broken DLC land may be allowed to continue? Whether illegalmining activity in Odisha should be investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation? Whether the grant of an ex post facto environmental clearancewould be detrimental to the environment? Whether there was a complete ban on non-forest activity on forestlands with effect from 12-12-1996? Whether the renewal of a mininglease after 27-1-1994 will require an EC? Whether there was a violation of Section 6 of the MMDR Act? Whether there was a violation of Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960? The forest area approved under the FC Act should not be lesser than the total forest area included in mining leasesapproved under the MMDR Act. Similarly, all mining leaseholders in Orissa should be directed to pay the NPV for the entire forest area included in mining leases. Mining operations in broken DLC land may be allowed to continue if other statutory requirements and rules are being complied with. The illegal or unlawful mining activity carried on in Odisha deserves to be investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation. The grant of an ex post facto environmental clearance would be detrimental to the environment.

There was a complete ban on non-forest activity on forest lands with effect from 12- 12-1996. The renewal of a mining lease after 27-1-1994 will require an EC even if there is no expansion or modernisation activityor any increase in the pollution load. There was a violation of Section 6 of the MMDR Act. Eight mining leaseholders violated Rule 37 of the MCR. The lessees operatingthe leases in violation of the law need to be passedan interim order. CEC will make out a list of such lessees who are operating the leases in violation of the law. The accountsof the SPV will be internally auditedannually by the Chartered Accountant firms empanelled with the CAG/Principal Accountant General, Odisha. All other pending IAs are disposed of in terms of our orders. Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Others[2017] 9 SCR 797 Facts The petitioner, Shayara Bano, filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the practice of Triple Talaq,which is a form of instant divorce prevalent in the Muslim community in India. The petitioner contended that the practice of Triple Talaqwas discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner also contended that

the practiceof Triple Talaq was not an essentialpart of Islam and was therefore not protected under Article 25 of the Constitution. Issues The main issues beforethe Supreme Court were: Whether the practice of Triple Talaq was violativeof the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India? Whether the practice of Triple Talaq was an essential part of Islam and was therefore protected under Article 25 of the Constitution of India? Whether Personal Law was subservient to legislation and whether the practice of Triple Talaq could be done away with by legislation? Ruling The Supreme Court, in a 3-2 majority ruling, held that the practice of Triple Talaq was unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. The Court held that the practice of Triple Talaq was not an essential part of Islam and was therefore not protected under Article 25 of the Constitution. The Court also held that Personal Law was subservient to legislation and that the practice of Triple Talaq could be done away with by legislation. Reasoning The Court relied on the following reasons to arriveat its decision:

The Court held that the practice of Triple Talaq was discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India as it allowed a Muslim husband to unilaterally divorce his wife without any reasonable cause or opportunity for reconciliation. The Court held that the practice of Triple Talaq was not an essential part of Islam and was therefore not protected under Article 25 of the Constitution of India. The Court relied on the fact that several Islamic countries had already done away with the practice of Triple Talaq. The Court held that PersonalLaw was subservient to legislation and that the practice of Triple Talaq could be done away with by legislation. The Court reliedon the fact that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, which governs the personal law of Muslims in India, was enacted to put an end to the unholy, oppressive and discriminatory customs and usages in the Muslim community. Impact The Supreme Court's ruling in the Triple Talaq case has been hailed as a landmark judgment and a victory for gender justice.The ruling has been seen as a step towards gender equality and the empowerment of Muslim women in India. The ruling has also been criticized by some Muslim groups who see it as an interference in their religious affairs. Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.)and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. [2017]10 SCR 569

Smart Summary Facts 'Unique makes you the only one' is the central message of Aadhaar, which is on the altar facing constitutional challenge in these petitions. Section 2 of the Act provides certain definitions. Section28 of the Aadhaar Act puts an obligation on the Authority to ensure the security of identity information and authentication records of individuals. Section 57 provides that the Aadhaar Act would not prevent the use of Aadhaar number for establishing the identity of an individual for any purpose. The challenge to this provisionis predicated on the ground that it provides for the use of Aadhaar database for police verification, which is againstthe ethos of Article 20(3) ofthe Constitution of India, which is a rule againstself-incrimination. The Aadhaar Act was validly passed as a Money Bill on the following grounds: a. The term 'targeted delivery of subsidies' contemplates an expenditure of funds from the Consolidated Fund of India, which brings the Aadhaar Act within the purview of a Money Bill under Art. 110 of the Constitution; b. Sections 7, 24, 25 and the Preamble of the Act also support its classification as a Money Bill; c. The Aadhaar Act has ancillary provisions, but they are related to the pith and substance of the legislation which is the targeted deliveryof subsidies and benefits; and d. Section57 of the Act is savedby Article 110 (1) (g) of the Constitution as it is a standalone provision and even if a Bill is not covered underPART C clauses (a) to (f) of Article110(1), it can still be covered under Article110 (g). Issues

Whether the Aadhaar Act violates the fundamental rights of citizens including the right to privacy and dignity? Whether Section7 of the Aadhaar Act militates againstConstitutional provisions of Article 243G? Whether Section 47 of the AadhaarAct is unconstitutional? Whether amended Rule 9 violates Section 3, 7 and 51 of the Aadhaar Act? Whether Section139-AA breaches fundamental Right of Privacyof an individual? Rule Laws limiting constitutional rights must satisfythe test of proportionality. Analysis Justice Sikri held that laws limiting constitutional rights must satisfy the test of proportionality. Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act is the most importantprovision of the Aadhaar Act around which entire architecture of Aadhaar Act has been built. The question to be considered is as to whether the Aadhaar Act in any manner militate with Constitutional provisions of Article 243G. The Aadhaar Act is an Act enacted by Parliament, which is referable to Entry 97 of List I. Section 46 of the Aadhaar Act clearlyprovides that the penalties underthe Aadhaar Act shall not interfere with other punishments. Section 139-AA, thus does not breach fundamental Right of Privacy of an individual and Section 139-AAcannot be struckdown on that ground. Conclusion

The challenge in this batch of casesis challenge to the Act and its various provisions on the ground that the Act and its provisions violate right of privacy which is now recognised as fundamental right. We close by once more recording of our appreciation for the cause espoused in these cases. Common Cause (A Regd.Society) v. Union of India& Another [2018]6 SCR Facts Issue: The unconstitutionality of Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code Intervenor: Societyfor the Right to Die with Dignity Facts: Constitution Benchconsidered the correctness of the decisionrendered in P. Rathinam in Gian Kaur State of Punjab A team of three doctors were appointed to examine the petitioner thoroughly and submit a report about her physical and mental condition Passive euthanasia is legal even without legislation, provided certain conditions and safeguards are maintained The SupremeCourt of Canada drew the distinction betweenactive and passive euthanasia on the basis of intention Right to health is a part of Article21 of the Constitution

Right to live with dignity includesright to die with dignity Advance directives or medical power of attorney shall be void and of no effect and shall not be binding on any medical practitioner Passive euthanasia would be permissible when a personis 'dead' in clinical sense The decision should be taken bona fide in the best interest of the patient Article 21 does not include rightto die The High Court under Article226 of the Constitution can grant approvalfor withdrawal of life support to such an incompetent person Decision: The right to die with dignity as fundamental right has already been declared by the Constitution Bench judgmentof this Court in Gian Kaur case (supra) which A person of competent mental faculty is entitled to execute an advance medical directive in accordance with safeguards as referred to above. MunicipalCorporation, Ujjain &Anr. v. BVG India Limitedand Ors. [2018]6 SCR 861 Brief Facts Ujjain Municipal Corporation (Appellant in civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 11967 of 2016) issued a Notice InvitingTender (NIT) on 01.05.2015 for the appointment of an agencyto carry out "Municipal Solid Waste Door to Door

Collection and Transportation" for a period of 10 years in the city of Ujjain. The tender notice was for inviting online bids from the eligible bidders following a two envelope system i.e. one for technical bid and anotherfor financial bid. Global Waste Management Cell Pvt. Ltd. got the first rank (L1 bidder) amongst the three bidders by getting the highest score based on technical and financial weighted scores. Legal Issues Whether the decision-making process followed by Ujjain Municipal Corporation was arbitrary or irrational? Ruling The Constitutional Court held that unless the decision-making process or the decision taken by the authority is affected by bias or actuated by mala fides, the Court should not intervene under Article 226 in disputesbetween two rival tenderers. The Court observed that the exercise of the power of judicial review should be avoided if there is no irrationality or arbitrariness. The High Court had ignored the element of public interest involved in the matter and had erroneously arrived at the score of 0.85 marks insteadof 17 marks. Consequently, the impugned judgmentand order of the High Court were set aside, and the Civil Appeal No. 3332 of 2018 filed by BVG India Limited was dismissed. Shakti Vahiniv. Union of India and Others [2018] 3 SCR 770

The case pertains to the issue of honour killings in India and the violation of fundamental rights and human dignity that it entails. The question before the court was whether the elders of a family or clan can be allowed to take the life of young individuals who have exercisedtheir choice to get marriedagainst the wishesof their elders or contrary to customary practicesof the clan. The court held that such killings are illegal and punishable under criminal law. Facts There has been a spateof honour killingsin Haryana, Punjaband Western Uttar Pradesh, and the trend is on the increase. Instances of beating, shaving of heads, and burning victims have been reported. The violation of human rights and destruction of fundamental rights take place in the name of class honouror group right or perverseindividual perception of honour. The State of Haryana has filed an affidavit denyingthe allegations made against the State and further stating that adequate protection has been given to couples. The State of Rajasthan has strongly deplored the exercise of unwarranted activities under the garb of Khap Panchayats. The State of Uttar Pradesh has acceded to comply with any directions which this Court may issue. The State of Bihar has acknowledged that honour killing is a heinous crime which violates the fundamental rights of the citizens. The State of Madhya Pradeshhas created a "Crime AgainstWomen Cell" at the State level headed by the Inspector Generalof Police to ensure safetyof couples and active prosecution in each case of honour killing.

The State of Himachal Pradeshhas stated that there are no Panchayats of the nature of Khap Panchayats operating in the State of Himachal Pradesh and that there have been no cases of honour killing reported in the past 10 years. An application for intervention, on behalf of several Khap Panchayats, filed by "Manushi Sanghatan" has been allowed. The petitioner has highlighted that some States have failedto effectively implement the Action Plan in pursuance of the directions issued by this Court. Issues Can elders of a family or clan be allowed to take the life of young individuals who have exercised their choice to get married against the wishes of their elders or contrary to customary practices of the clan? What are the constitutional provisions that are violatedby honour killings? What steps can be taken by the State to prevent honour killings? What legislative measurescan be taken to do away with social menaceslike honour killings? Arguments Assertion of choice is an inseparable facet of libertyand dignity. Feudal perception has to melt into oblivionpaving the smoothpath for liberty. The existence of a woman in such an atmosphere is entirely dependent on the male view of the reputation of the family, the community, and the milieu. Honour killings are treated as murder as defined under Section 300 of the IPC and punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.

The State is duty-bound to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens, and an inherent aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution would be the freedom of choice in marriage. Honour killing guillotines individual liberty, freedom of choice and one's own perception of choice. The Constitution and the laws of this country do not countenance such an act, and the whole activity is illegal and punishable as an offence under the criminal law. Law enforcement agencies should be sensitized to mandate social initiatives and awareness to curb such violence. Immediate steps should be taken to provide security to the couple/family and, if necessary, to remove them to a safe house. The criminal cases pertaining to honour killing or violence to thecouple(s) shall be tried before the designated Court/Fast Track Court earmarked for that purpose. Decision The court held that the elders of a family or clan cannot be allowed to take the life of young individuals who have exercised their choice to get married against the wishes of their elders or contrary to customary practices of the clan. The court also held that honour killings are illegal and punishable under criminal law. The court recommended that the legislature bring a law appositely coveringthe field of honour killing. The court directed law enforcement agencies to take strong measures to prevent such atrocious acts and to provide security to the couple/family. The court also directed that criminal cases pertaining to honour killing or violence to the couple(s) shall be tried beforethe designated Court/Fast Track Court earmarked for that purpose.

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [2018] 8 SCR 1 Facts 'Unique makes you the only one' is the central message of Aadhaar, which is on the altar facing constitutional challenge in these petitions. Section 2 of the Act provides certain definitions. Section28 of the Aadhaar Act puts an obligation on the Authority to ensure the security of identity information and authentication records of individuals. Section 57 provides that the Aadhaar Act would not prevent the use of Aadhaar number for establishing the identity of an individual for any purpose. The challenge to this provisionis predicated on the ground that it provides for the use of Aadhaar database for police verification, which is againstthe ethos of Article 20(3) ofthe Constitution of India, which is a rule againstself-incrimination. The Aadhaar Act was validly passed as a Money Bill on the following grounds: a. The term 'targeted delivery of subsidies' contemplates an expenditure of funds from the Consolidated Fund of India, which brings the Aadhaar Act within the purview of a Money Bill under Art. 110 of the Constitution; b. Sections 7, 24, 25 and the Preamble of the Act also support its classification as a Money Bill; c. The Aadhaar Act has ancillary provisions, but they are related to the pith and substance of the legislation which is the targeted deliveryof subsidies and benefits; and d. Section57 of the Act is savedby Article 110 (1) (g) of the Constitution as it is a standalone provision and even if a Bill is not covered underPART C clauses (a) to (f) of Article110(1), it can still be covered under Article110 (g). Issues

Whether the Aadhaar Act violates the fundamental rights of citizens including the right to privacy and dignity? Whether Section7 of the Aadhaar Act militates againstConstitutional provisions of Article 243G? Whether Section 47 of the AadhaarAct is unconstitutional? Whether amended Rule 9 violates Section 3, 7 and 51 of the Aadhaar Act? Whether Section139-AA breaches fundamental Right of Privacyof an individual? Rule Laws limiting constitutional rights must satisfythe test of proportionality. Analysis Justice Sikri held that laws limiting constitutional rights must satisfy the test of proportionality. Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act is the most importantprovision of the Aadhaar Act around which entire architecture of Aadhaar Act has been built. The question to be considered is as to whether the Aadhaar Act in any manner militate with Constitutional provisions of Article 243G. The Aadhaar Act is an Act enacted by Parliament, which is referable to Entry 97 of List I. Section 46 of the Aadhaar Act clearlyprovides that the penalties underthe Aadhaar Act shall not interfere with other punishments. Section 139-AA, thus does not breach fundamental Right of Privacy of an individual and Section 139-AAcannot be struckdown on that ground. Conclusion 110

The challenge in this batch of casesis challenge to the Act and its various provisions on the ground that the Act and its provisions violate right of privacy which is now recognised as fundamental right. We close by once more recording of our appreciation for the cause espoused in these cases. Jarnail Singh & Othersv. Lachhmi NarainGupta & Others[2018] 10 SCR 663 The present group of cases arises out of two reference orders - the first by a two- Judge Bench referred to in a second reference order, dated 15.11.2017, which is by a three-Judge Bench, which has referred the correctness of the decision in M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006)8 SCC 212, ("Nagaraj"), to a Constitution Bench. Facts: The controversy in these mattersrevolves around the interpretation of the following Articles of the Constitution of India: "16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.— xxx xxx xxx (4-A) Nothingin this articleshall prevent the State

from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class or classesof posts in the servicesunder the State infavour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinionof the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State. We have heard wide-ranging arguments on either side for a couple of days, raising several points. The learnedAttorney General for India, Shri K.K. Venugopal, led the charge for reconsideration of Nagaraj (supra). Issue: The bone of contention in this landmark judgment was the Mandal Commission Report of 1980, which was laid beforeParliament on two occasions - once in 1982, and again in 1983. Decision: Thus, the Court struck down the AndhraPradesh Scheduled Castes (Rationalisation of Reservations) Act, 2000. Reasoning: It is importantto notice that the majorityjudgment of Hegde, J. does not refer to the creamy layer principle at all. Analysis:

Therefore, when Nagaraj (supra) applied the creamy layer test to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in exercise of application of the basic structure test to uphold the constitutional amendments leading to Articles16(4-A) and 16(4-B),it did not in any manner interfere with Parliament's power under Article 341 or Article 342. Joseph Shine v. Union of India [2018] 11 SCR 765 Introduction The petitioner has filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) which makes 'adultery' a criminal offence, punishable with imprisonment up to five years and fine. The petitioner has also challenged Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Facts The Law Commission of India, in its Forty-second Report, 1971, recommended the retention of Section497 in its present form with the modification that even the wife, who has sexual relations with a person other than her husband, should be made punishable for adultery. The decisionof a two-judge Bench in V Revathiv Union of India involved a challenge to Section 497 (read with Section 198(2) of the CrPC) which disables a wife from prosecuting her husband for being involved in an adulterous relationship. The present writ petition challenges the constitutional validity of Section497 and Section 198(2) of the CrPC.

Issues Whether Section 497 of the IPC is unconstitutional as violative of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution? Whether Section 198(2) of the CrPC is unconstitutional only to the extent that it is applicable to the offence of Adultery under Section 497? Ruling The Court held that Section497 of the IPC is struck down as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. Section 198(2) of the CrPC is unconstitutional only to the extent that it is applicable to the offence of Adultery under Section 497. Reasoning The Court held that Section 497 of the IPC is destructive of and deprives a woman of her agency, autonomy, and dignity. It denudes a woman of her sexual autonomy by making its free exercise conditional on the consent of her spouse. The Court recognized the right to choose a partner as a fundamental right under Articles19 and 21 of the Constitution. The Court overruled its previous decisions in Sowmithri Vishnu and Revathi. The Court declared that Section 497 is struck down as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. Section 198(2) of the CrPC is unconstitutional only to the extent that it is applicable to the offence of Adultery under Section 497.

Conclusion The Court struckdown Section 497 of the IPC as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. Section 198(2) of the CrPC was declared unconstitutional only to the extent that it is applicable to the offence of Adultery under Section 497. Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Limited and Others [2018] 14 SCR 489 Facts RJIL filed a complaint under Section 19(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, alleging anti-competitive agreement/cartel formed by the three major telecom operators. CCI received the complaint and had to form an opinion as to whether there exists a prima facie case or not. The High Court quashed the order passed by the CCI and the notices issued by the Director General of the CCI. TRAI recommended that Rs. 50 crore per local service area (LSA) be imposed on all the above three telecom operators for failure to adhere to TRAI norms and regulations. The TRAI sent its response to the DoT, stating that telecom operators have intentionally denied and delayed the augmentation of POIs to RJIL. The Commission directed the DG to investigate the matter under the provisions of Section 26(1) of the Act. Issues

Whether the conductof the three telecom operators amounts to a "cartel" in relation to denial of POIs to RJIL. Whether the CCI has the jurisdiction to investigate an alleged cartelwithout impinging upon TRAI's jurisdiction to regulate the industry. Whether the TRAI Act is a complete code. Whether the CCI's order was quasi-judicial or administrative. Decision The High Court held that the CCI could exercisejurisdiction only afterproceedings under the TRAI Act had concluded/attained finality.The ultimate direction given by the High Court quashingthe order passedby the CCI was not liable to be interfered with as such an exercise carried out by the CCI was premature. Reasoning The telecom marketis regulated by the statutory regime contained in the TRAI Act. TRAI is established as a regulator which exercises control/supervision and also provides guidance to the telecom/mobile market. The TRAI Act is a complete code and TRAI has the exclusive jurisdiction to examine the disputes between licensees. The CCI can exercise powers under Section 26 only after complying with Section 21A. The finding of the High Court that the CCI's order was quasi-judicial was erroneous as it was an administrative order. The CCI's exercise of jurisdiction was premature as it could only proceed after the TRAI returns its findings on the jurisdictional aspects. 116

Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India &Ors. [2019] 3 SCR 535 Issue Whether the Code is constitutionally valid? Rule Sections 5(7) and 5(8) of the Code define ?financial creditor? and ?financial debt?. Under the CIRP Regulations, the resolution professional has to vet and verifyclaims made, and ultimately, determine the amount of each claim. ?Related party? is defined in the Code. Analysis The court is only deciding questions relating to the constitutional validity of the Code and is not going into the individual factsof any case. Sections 5(7) and 5(8) of the Code define ?financial creditor? and ?financial debt? in detail. The CIRP Regulations provide for the vettingand verification of claims made by the resolution professional, who ultimately determines the amount of each claim. The Code also defines ?related party? in detail. Conclusion

The court has provideda detailed analysisof the definitions of ?financial creditor?, ?financial debt? and ?related party? under the Code. The court has not made any decision on the constitutional validity of the Code. Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National HighwaysAuthority of India (NHAI) [2019] 7 SCR 522 Facts: The respondent, NHAI, invited bids for construction of a four-lane bypass on National Highway 26 in the State of Madhya Pradesh.The appellant challenged the validity of the Circular by filing a writ petitionin the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The Delhi High Courtrestrained the respondent from implementing the said Circular retrospectively. The appellant's argument that the linking factor is de hors the contract and not at all requiredwas rejected. The dissenting award awarded the claim of the claimant-appellant in full. The question which arises is whether the amendments made in Section 34 are applicable to applications filed under Section 34 to set aside arbitral awards made after 23.10.2015. It is enough to state that Section 26 of the Amendment Act makes it clear that the Amendment Act, as a whole, is prospective in nature. In fact, the same Law Commission Report has amended Sections 28 and 34 so as to narrow grounds of challenge available under the Act. Issue: 118

Whether the amendments made in Section 34 are applicable to applications filed under Section 34 to set aside arbitral awards made after 23.10.2015. Rule: Section 34 of the Act deals with setting aside a domesticaward and a domestic award resulting from an international commercial arbitration whereassection 48 deals with conditions for enforcement of foreign awards. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2)of the Act. Section 68(2)(b)does not permit a challenge on the ground that the tribunal arrived at a wrong conclusion as a matter of law or fact. Although the concept of public policy of the State is not defined in the Act or the Model Law, the general consensus of judicial and expert opinion is that public policy under the Act encompasses a narrow scope. Analysis: The amendments made in Explanations 1 and 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) have been made for the avoidance of any doubt, which language, however, is not found in Section 34(2A). Therefore, even in cases where, for avoidance of doubt, something is clarified by way of an amendment, such clarification cannotbe retrospective if the earlier law has been changed substantively. It is clear that the juristic principle of a "judicial approach" demands that a decision be fair, reasonable and objective. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. Therefore, among others, the Wednesbury principleof reasonableness has now been incorporated into the publicpolicy test under Section 34, as it is deemedto be part of "fundamental policy of Indian law." Such a power to review an award on

merits is contrary to the object of the Act and international practice. Although the concept of public policy of the State is not defined in the Act or the Model Law, the general consensus of judicial and expert opinion is that public policy under the Act encompasses a narrow scope. Conclusion: Given the reliefs claimed by the appellant in their statement of claim before the learned arbitrators, what is awarded to the appellant is the principal sum of INR 2,01,42,827/- towards price adjustment payable under sub-clause 70.3 of the contract, for the work done under the contract from September 2010 to May 2014, as well as interest at the rate of 10%, compounded monthly from the due date of payment to the date of the award, i.e., 02.05.2016, plus future interest at the rate of 12% per annum (simple) till the date of payment. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Ashwani Kumar v Union of India and Anr [2019] 12 SCR 30 Summary The petitioner, Dr. Ashwani Kumar, filed a Writ Petition (Civil) No. 738 of 2016 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, seeking a legislative framework/law against custodial torture,based on the 'Convention againstTorture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment' adoptedby the United Nations

General Assembly. The petitioner prayed for a direction to the CentralGovernment to enact a suitable stand-alone, comprehensive legislation against custodial torture, similar to the direction given in the case of mob violence/lynching vide its judgment 17th July 2018. The Union of India responded by stating that the draft legislation prepared on the basis of the Law Commission's report is under active consideration and was referred to stakeholders, that is, the States and Union Territories for their inputs and suggestions. The High Court rejectedthe petitioner's prayer,but clarified that the rejection would not affect the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with individual cases of alleged custodial torture and pass appropriate orders and directions in accordance with law. Facts Dr. Ashwani Kumar filed a Writ Petition (Civil) No. 738 of 2016 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, seeking a legislative framework/law against custodial torture. The petitioner prayed for a direction to the Central Government to enact a suitable stand-alone, comprehensive legislation against custodial torture, similar to the direction given in the case of mob violence/lynching vide its judgment 17th July 2018. The Union of India responded by stating that the draft legislation prepared on the basis of the Law Commission's report is underactive consideration and was referred to stakeholders, that is, the States and Union Territories for their inputs and suggestions. Issues 121

Whether the High Court can issue directions to the legislature to make any particular kind of enactment? Whether the rejection of the prayer made by the petitioner would affect the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with individual cases of alleged custodial torture and pass appropriate orders and directions in accordance with law? Arguments The petitioner argued that the Government's reluctance to ratify the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which envisages a comprehensive and standalone legislation against custodial torture, is baffling and unintelligible. The Union of India argued that any direction by the High Court requiring the Parliament to frame a law or modify an enactment in a particular manner would violate doctrine of separation of powers, a basic feature of the Constitution. Analysis The High Court rejected the petitioner's prayer, stating that the courts cannot issue directions to the legislature to make any particular kind of enactment, and that the exercise of the amendment of the Act, which is presently underway,must be allowed to be completed without any intervention of the Court. The High Court clarified that the rejection of the prayermade by the petitioner would not affect the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with individual cases of alleged custodial tortureand pass appropriate orders and directions in accordance with law. Conclusion 122

The High Court rejected the petitioner's prayer for a direction to the Central Government to enact a suitable stand-alone, comprehensive legislation against custodial torture, but clarified that the rejection would not affect the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with individual cases of alleged custodial torture and pass appropriate orders and directions in accordance with law. Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd and Ors [2019] 16 SCR 1 Smart Summary Facts: The concept of Tribunals was introduced to provide speedyand inexpensive justice and to decongest the court system. The functioning of Tribunals must be reviewed on the test of speedy and inexpensive quality justice. The Court expressed concern over the ineffectivity of alternative mechanisms for judicial review. Technical members could be appointedin addition to judicial membersonly when specialized knowledge or expertise was required. A Constitution Bench of the Court observed that setting up a Tribunal with a seat in Delhi may deprive litigants of convenience of access to justice. Appointment of non-judicial members may constitute dilution and encroachment upon independence of judiciary and rule of law. The judicial members are to handle substantial questions of law. Overcrowding of the docket of the Court obstructed the key constitutional role of the Court. The selection procedure must ensure independence of judiciary. The Tribunals must be manned by a regular cadre. Revisitof the structure of Tribunals was necessary to uphold the ruleof law

and independence of judiciary, which may enhanceaccess to justiceand obviate the need for travelling long distances, particularly for parties in remote areas. Issue: Whether the structure of Tribunals is consistent with the constitutional scheme and whether access to justice is being adequately provided through Tribunals. Decision: The Union of India was not averse to revisiting the issue of access to justice. The 74th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee recommended the creation of a National Tribunal Commission to oversee all the Tribunals in the country. The suggestion was made that the members of the Tribunals should be recruited by national competition. The learnedamicus suggested settingup an All India Tribunal service on the pattern of the UK. A regular cadre for the Tribunals can be on the pattern of cadres for the judiciary. Wherever there is only one seat of the Tribunal, its Benchesshould be available either in all states or at leastin all regions wherever there is litigation instead of only one place. In the alternative, jurisdiction can be conferred on existing courts as special Courts or Tribunals. The above issues may require urgent settingup of a committee, preferably of three members,one of whom must be a retired judge of this Court who may have served in a Tribunal. Such Committee can have interaction with all stakeholders and suggest a mechanism consistent with the constitutional scheme. Rationale:

The concept of Tribunals was introduced to provide speedyand inexpensive justice and to decongest the court system. However, the functioning of Tribunals must be reviewed on the test of speedy and inexpensive quality justice. The appointment of non-judicial membersmay constitute dilutionand encroachment upon independence of judiciary and rule of law. The judicial membersare to handle substantial questions of law. Revisit of the structure of Tribunals was necessary to uphold the rule of law and independence of judiciary, which may enhanceaccess to justiceand obviate the need for travelling long distances, particularly for parties in remote areas. The creation of a National Tribunal Commission and an All India Tribunal service, and recruitment of members by national competition may ensure the independence of judiciary and improve access to justice. The setting up of Benches in all states or regions where there is litigation insteadof only one place may further enhanceaccess to justice. Analysis: The concept of Tribunals was introduced to provide speedy and inexpensive justice and to decongest the court system. However, the functioning of Tribunals must be reviewed on the test of speedy and inexpensive quality justice. The appointment of non-judicial members may constitute dilution and encroachment upon independence of judiciaryand rule of law. The judicial membersare to handle substantial questions of law. Revisit of the structure of Tribunals was necessary to uphold the rule of law and independence of judiciary, which may enhanceaccess to justiceand obviate the needfor travelling long distances, particularly for parties in remote areas.The creation of a NationalTribunal Commission and an All India Tribunalservice, and

recruitment of members by national competition may ensure the independence of judiciary and improve access to justice. The setting up of Benches in all states or regions where there is litigation instead of only one place may furtherenhance access to justice. Conclusion: The Court recorded that the revisit of the structure of Tribunals was necessary to uphold the rule of law and independence of judiciary, which may enhanceaccess to justice and obviate the need for travelling long distances, particularly for parties in remote areas. The issues raised may require urgent setting up of a committee, preferably of three members, one of whom must be a retiredjudge of this Court who may have served in a Tribunal. Such Committee can have interaction with all stakeholders and suggest a mechanism consistent with the constitutional scheme. CPIO v Subhash ChandraAgarwal [2019] 16 SCR 424 Background Subhash Chandra Agarwal filed an application before the CPIO, Supreme Court of India on July 6, 2009, to obtaina copy of the completecorrespondence with the then Chief Justice of India. The Times of India had reported that a Union Minister had approached Mr. JusticeR. Reghupathi of the High Court of Madras to influence his judicial decisions. The CPIO denied the information on the ground that it was not

handled by the Registry of the Supreme Court of India and the information was neither maintained nor available with the Registry.The first appeal filed by Subhash Chandra Aggarwal was dismissed by the appellate authority on September 5, 2009. Legal Issues Whether the information sought by Subhash Chandra Agarwal was exempt under Section 8 of the RTI Act? Whether the CPIO, Supreme Court of India was a "public authority" under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act? Whether the right to information is subject to the conditions and exemptions under the RTI Act? Whether the decision of the Court in S P Gupta v Union of India is a binding precedent on the issues raised? Whether the correspondence betweenconstitutional functionaries constitutes a class of documents exempt from public disclosure? Whether the RTI Act abridgesthe right to privacy? What factorsweigh in favour of disclosure in the "public interest"? Ruling The Court held that the information sought by Subhash Chandra Agarwal was not exempt under Section 8 of the RTI Act. The CPIO, Supreme Court of India was a "public authority" under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. The right to information is subject to the conditions and exemptions under the RTI Act. The decision of the Court in S P Guptav Union of India is relevant to the presentdispute. The correspondence between constitutional functionaries does not constitute a class of

documents exempt from public disclosure. The RTI Act does not abridge the right to privacy. The factors that weigh in favour of disclosure in the "public interest" are specific to each unique case. Reasoning The RTI Act recognizes the constitutional right of citizensto freedom of speech and expression. The term "public authority" under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act includes any authority or body or an institution of self-government established by the Constitution or under the Constitution. The right to information is not absolute and is subjectto the conditions and exemptions under the RTI Act. The exemption under section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act does not apply to beneficiaries regarding whom the fiduciary holds information. The RTI Act captures the interplay of the competing rights under clause (j) to Section 8(1) and Section 11. The Court rejected the contention that candour and frankness justifythe grant of complete immunityagainst disclosures. The independence of the judiciary is a constitutional guarantee of freedom. The factors that weigh in favour of disclosure in the "public interest" are specific to each unique case. Conclusion Placing the criteria followed in making judicial appointments in the public domain will fulfil the purpose and mandate of Section 4 of the RTI Act, engender public confidence in the process and provides a safeguard against extraneous considerations entering into the process.

Committee of Creditorsof Essar Steel v Satish Kumar Gupta and Ors [2019] 16 SCR Facts: Sections 4 and 6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019 have been challenged. ArcelorMittal and Numetal were declared ineligible by the court due to their resolution plans being hit by Section 29-A of the Code. The final negotiated resolution plan of ArcelorMittal was approved by the Committee of Creditors by a 92.24% majority. Section 53 of the Code cannot be applied during the corporate resolution process but will apply only at the stage of liquidation. The Core Committee conducted secret negotiations with ArcelorMittal by which it buried Standard Chartered Bank's debt almost completely. The decision of the Committee of Creditors on the mannerof distribution in the facts of this case is illegal and arbitrary. The legislature has overstepped the separation of powers boundaries to legislatively adjudicate the facts of a particular case. The status of Standard Chartered Bank as a secured financial creditor has not been disputed by any member of the Committee of Creditors. Timelines cannot be imposed or stipulated for the adjudication of disputes by any court, least of all the Supreme Court of India. The resolution professional has the duty to preserve and protect assets of the corporate debtor including the continued businessoperations of the corporate debtor. Regulation 36 is importantas it forms the basis for the submission of a resolution plan. 129

The resolution professional is to collect, collate and finally admit claims of all creditors. Section 30(2)(e) does not empowerthe Resolution Professional to "decide" whether the resolution plan does or does not contravene the provisions of law. The Code is a Code for reorganization and insolvency resolution of corporate debtors. The objective of equitable treatment is based on the notion that, in collective proceedings, creditors with similar legal rights should be treated fairly. The law must clearly lay out the priority of distributions in bankruptcy to all stakeholders. A resolution plan cannot pass muster under Section 30(2)(b) read with Section 31 unless a minimum payment is made to operational creditors, being not less than liquidation value. Sections 4 and 6 of the Amending Act of 2019 cannot be struck down. The word "mandatorily" in relation to the 330-dayperiod is struck down. Section 53 is only referred to in orderthat a certain minimum figurebe paid to different classes of operational and financial creditors. Issues: Whether Sections 4 and 6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019 are constitutionally valid. Whether the decision of the Committeeof Creditors on the mannerof distribution in the facts of this case is illegal and arbitrary. Whether the legislature has overstepped the separation of powers boundaries to legislatively adjudicate the facts of a particular case. 130

Whether timelines can be imposed or stipulated for the adjudication of disputes by any court, least of all the Supreme Court of India. Whether the resolution professional has the duty to preserve and protect assetsof the corporate debtorincluding the continued business operations of the corporatedebtor. Whether a resolution plan can pass muster under Section 30(2)(b)read with Section 31 unless a minimum payment is made to operational creditors, being not less than liquidation value. Whether the word "mandatorily" in relation to the 330-dayperiod is constitutionally valid. Whether Section 53 is constitutionally infirm. Ruling: Sections 4 and 6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019 are constitutionally valid. The decision of the Committee of Creditors on the mannerof distribution in the facts of this case is illegal and arbitrary. The legislature has overstepped the separation of powers boundaries to legislatively adjudicate the facts of a particular case. Timelines cannot be imposed or stipulated for the adjudication of disputes by any court, least of all the Supreme Court of India. The resolution professional has the duty to preserve and protect assets of the corporate debtor including the continued businessoperations of the corporate debtor. A resolution plan cannot pass muster under Section 30(2)(b) read with Section 31 unless a minimum payment is made to operational creditors, being not less than liquidation value. The word "mandatorily" in relation to the 330-dayperiod is struckdown.

Section 53 is not constitutionally infirm. Shanti Conductors Pvt Ltd v Assam StateElectricity Board and Ors [2019]16 SCR 252 Facts: These review petitions have been filed against the common judgment dated 23.01.2019 passed in Civil AppealNos. 8442-8443 of 2016, CivilAppeal No. 8450 of 2016 and Civil Appeal No. 8445 of 2016, by which all the Civil Appeals were dismissed, sought to be reviewed by these applications. All the review petitions filed have raised different grounds, which need to be considered separately. After dismissal of the above Civil Appeals, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the RFA No. 66 of 2000 filed by the respondents and dismissed the suit of the petitioner. The matter was referred to Three Judge Bench, which heard all the appealsand vide its judgment dated 23.01.2019 dismissed the appeals. Issues: Whether the petitioner is entitled for benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act? 132

Whether the reviewon the ground on which liberty was sought was accepted by the High Court in its review judgment? Arguments: Shri Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner submits that there is an apparent error in the judgment dated 23.01.2019 in holding that suit was barred by time. It is submitted that Section 19 escaped the notice of this Court while answering the question of limitation, which is an error apparent, need to be corrected and it has to be held that suit was well within time. Shri Hansaria further submits that for taking benefit under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, therehas to be specific pleadingand proof in the suit.Plaintiffs have neither pleaded any ground for claiming benefit under Section 19 nor proved the same in the suit, hence benefitof Section 19 cannot be extended. He further submits that for taking benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, there has to be acknowledgment of the payment, which is a question of fact required to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiffs. The petitioner in the plaint has clearly not pleaded for benefit of Section 19 nor has brought necessary facts to enable the Court to consider the claim under Section 19. We, thus, are of the view that petitioner is not entitled for benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act and there is no error in the judgment of this Court dated 23.01.2019 holding that the suit of the plaintiff was barred by time. 133

The High Court granted interestat the rate of 9% per annum.Review judgment does not grant interest under Act, 1993 since the High Court in the review judgment did not interfere with the earlier finding that petitioner is not entitled for benefit under Act, 1993. The review on the ground on which liberty was sought was in essence not acceptedby the High Court in its review judgment. Moreover, in judgment dated 23.01.2019, the maintainability of appeal havingbeen considered and found against the petitioner, we do not find any ground to review the petition. Conclusion: The scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions, which have already ben addressed and decided. In result, Review Petition (C) Nos. 786-787 of 2019, Review Petition (C) No. 789 of 2019 and ReviewPetition (C) No. 788 of 2019 are dismissed. Keisham Meghachandra Singh v The Honble Speakerand Ors [2020] 2 SCR 132 Facts The Indian National Congress emerged as the single largest party with 28 seats in the 11 Manipur Legislative Assembly election held in March 2017. The Bharatiya Janata Party came second with 21 seats. On the same day, Respondent No. 3 was sworn in as a Ministerin the BJP-led government and continues as such till date. Thirteen applications for the disqualification of Respondent No. 3 were filed before 134

the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly between April and July 2017 stating that Respondent No. 3 was disqualified underparagraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule. The High Court heard the writ petitionand disposed of it by the impugnedjudgment dated 23.07.2019. The High Courtheld that the Speaker is a quasi-judicial authority who is required to take a decision within a reasonable time. The Court went on to hear the writ petition on merits but ultimately declinedto grant any relief in the writ petition. Issues Whether the Speakerhas deliberately refusedto decide the disqualification petitions before him? Whether the Appellant is entitled to a writ of quo warranto against Respondent No. 3? Whether there is immunity underArticles 122 and 212 from judicial scrutinyof the decision of the Speaker or Chairman exercising power under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule? Whether the power to resolve such disputes vested in the Speaker or Chairman is a judicial power? Whether the decision of the Speaker in the case on hand can be considered to be an order in terms of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution? Whether the Speaker, in acting as a Tribunal under the Tenth Schedule, is bound to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period? 135

Whether disqualification petitions ought to be entrusted to a Speaker as a quasi- judicial authority when such Speaker continues to belong to a particular political party either de jure or de facto? Decision A substantial question as to the interpretation of the Constitution arises on the facts of the presentcase. However, the issue was already addressedby a Five Judge Bench judgment in Rajendra Singh Rana and has already been answered. The Court made itclear that judicialreview is not available at a stageprior to the making of a decision by the Speaker eitherby a way of quia timet actionor by other interlocutory orders. The Speaker, in acting as a Tribunal under the Tenth Schedule, is bound to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period.It is time that Parliament have a rethink on whether disqualification petitions ought to be entrusted to a Speakeras a quasi-judicial authority when such Speaker continues to belong to a particular political party either de jure or defacto. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 23.07.2019 is set aside. The Civil Appealsarising out of SLP(C) No. 18659 of 2019and SLP(C) No. 18763 of 2019 are partly allowedand the Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) No. 23703 of 2019 and SLP(C) No. 24146 of 2019 are dismissed in terms of this judgment. Sushila Aggarwaland Ors v State NCT of Delhi and Anr [2020] 2 SCR 1 Smart Summary Questions referredfor consideration by a larger Bench: 136

Whether the protection granted to a person under Section 438 CrPC should be limited to a fixed period so as to enablethe person to surrender beforethe trial court and seek regular bail. Whether the life of an anticipatory bail should end at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the court. Facts: Shri Viswanathan, learned Amicus Curiae submitted that the power of arrest of the police is under Section 41 CrPC. A bare reading of Section 438 CrPC shows that there is nothing in the languageof the Section which goes to show that the pre-arrest bail granted under Section 438 has to be time-bound. The High Court rejected the application for bail after summarising, what according to it was the true legal position. Issues: Whether the court has the power to impose conditions while granting anticipatory bail? Whether an order of bail can be passed under Section 438 CrPC without notice to the Public Prosecutor? Whether the powersunder Section 438 CrPC are subject to limitation of Section 437 CrPC? Whether the interpretation of Section 438 CrPC ? that it does not encapsulate Article 21 ? is erroneous?

Whether the discretion vested with the court under Section 438 CrPC shouldbe exercised with caution and prudence? Ruling: While cautioning against imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of the section, the Constitution Bench (1980) 2 SCC 565, 1980 SCC (Cri) 465 laid down the following guidelines, whichthe courts are required to keep in mind while dealing with an application for grant of anticipatory bail: No blanketorder of bail should be passed and the court which grants anticipatory bail must take care to specify the offence or the offences in respect of which alone the order will be effective. The High Court cancelled the grant of relief. The discretion vested with the court under Section 438 CrPC shouldalso be exercised with caution and prudence. The court, in exercise of power under Section 437(5) or 439(2) CrPC, can direct for taking into custody the accused who has alreadybeen granted bail after cancellation of his bail. Theinterpretation of Section438 CrPC ? that it does not encapsulate Article21 ? is erroneous. The decision in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State Of Maharashtra (2018) 13 SCC 813, (2019)1 SCC (Cri) 424 and Naresh Kumar Yadav v. Ravindra Kumar (2008) 1 SCC 632, (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 277 whichlay down such restrictive conditions, or terms limiting the grant of anticipatory bail, to a period of time are hereby overruled. Dheeraj Mor v High Court of Delhi [2020]2 SCR 161

Issue: Whether members of the subordinate judicial service are eligible for appointment as DistrictJudge against the quota reservedfor the Bar by way of direct recruitment, as per the interpretation of Article 233 of the Constitution of India. Decision: Members of the judicial service, regardless of their previous experience as an Advocatewith seven years practice, cannotapply and competefor appointment to any vacancy in the post of District Judge, and their chance to occupy that post would be through promotion, in accordance with Rules framed under Article 234 and proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Facts The petitioners, who were in judicial service, claimed that a candidate who has completed 7 years of practice as an advocate before joining judicial service should be eligible to stake claim against the direct recruitment quota from the Bar, notwithstanding that on the date of application/appointment, he or she is in judicial service of the Union or State. They contended that experience as a judge should be treated at par with the Bar service,and they should be permitted to stake theirclaim. The rules framed by the Governor empowering him to recruit District Judges from the judicial officerswere held to be unconstitutional. Thereafter, district judgeshave been recruited only from either the judicial service or from the Bar. Reasoning 139

The main question for consideration was the interpretation of Article 233 of the Constitution of India,and based upon its interpretation, the question concerning the rules being ultra vires of the same had to be examined. Article 233(1) provides for appointments by way of posting and promotion. A person from judicial service can be appointed as a DistrictJudge. Under Art. 233(2) of the Constitution, the Governor can only appoint advocates recommended by the High Courtto the said service. The relevant rules, therefore, clearly contravene the constitutional mandates of Art. 233(1) and (2) of the Constitution and are, therefore, illegal. It was further submitted that the decision in All India Judges Association case (supra) has prescribed a quota for merit promotionfrom the inservicecandidates and 25% of the quota for direct recruitment from the Bar. The decision in All India Judges Association case (supra) is inadvertent and cannot be said to be binding.The quota system from the service and the Bar would apply to those who apply within the quota. The quota system cannot override the constitutional scheme of Article 233(1) and (2). Article 233 is a self-contained provision regarding the appointment of District Judges. No special qualifications were prescribed under clause (1) of Article 233. However, as to a personnot already in service, the qualification prescribed in Article 233 is that he should be an advocate or a pleader of 7 years' standing. The court held that a candidate for direct recruitment from the Bar does not become eligible for the appointment of District Judges in any State without the recommendation of the High Court. The court observed that there should be equal opportunity to enter the servicefor all the sources of recruitment. 140

It must be remembered that District Judges may be directly appointed or may be promoted from the subordinate ranks of the judiciary. Certain recommendations of the Shetty Commission have been referredto, but after their consideration in the All India Judges Association case, there is no scope for considering the provisions of the Constitution to provideeligibility for inservice candidates for directrecruitment for the post of District Judge. In view of the above discussion, the court held that under Article 233, a judicial officer, regardless of her or his previousexperience as an Advocate with seven years practice cannot apply, and compete for appointment to any vacancy in the post of District Judge; her or his chanceto occupy that post wouldbe through promotion, in accordance with Rules framed under Article 234 and proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Conclusion The rules framedby the High Court prohibiting judicial service officersfrom staking claim to the post of District Judge against the posts reserved for Advocates by way of direct recruitment, cannot be said to be ultra vires and are in conformity with Articles 14, 16 and 233 of the Constitution of India. Membersof the judicial service cannot be considered for appointment to the Supreme Court. The decision in Vijay Kumar Mishra (supra) to the extent that it is contrary to Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra), as regards participation in the selection process of candidates who are members of the judicial service, for appointment to the post of District Judge, from 141

amongst the quota earmarked for advocates with seven years practice, was wrongly decided. To that extent, Vijay Kumar Mishra (supra) is hereby overruled. Internet and Mobile Association of India v RBI [2020] 2 SCR 297 Facts The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued a "Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies" on April 5, 2018, which directed regulated entities not to deal with or provide services to individuals or businesses dealing with or settling virtual currencies (VCs). The statement also required entities to exit any existing relationships with such individuals or businesses. The petitioners challenged the statement, seeking a direction to the respondents not to restrict banks and financial institutions from providing access to banking services for those engaged in transactions in crypto assets. Issues Whether the RBI has the power to issue the impugned circularon virtual currencies? Whether the impugned circularviolates Article 19(1)(g)of the Indian Constitution? Whether the impugned circular is proportionate? Decision The court held that the RBI has the power to issue the impugned circular on virtual currencies. The court also held that the impugned circular does not violate Article

19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution. However, the court found that the impugned circular is not proportionate. Reasoning The court found that the RBI has the power to issue the impugned circular under various statutes, including the RBI Act, the Banking Regulation Act, and the Payment and Settlement Systems Act. The court also noted that virtual currencies raise concerns of consumer protection, market integrity, and money laundering, among others. The court rejectedthe argument that the impugnedcircular violates Article19(1)(g) of the IndianConstitution, as there is no fundamental right to purchase,sell, transact or investin virtual currencies. The court also noted that virtual currencies cannot be stored in any physical shape or form, making their regulation difficult. However, the court found that the impugned circular is not proportionate, as it has almost wiped virtual currency exchanges out of the industrial map of the country, infringing Article 19(1)(g). The court noted that a ban on virtual currencies might decrease the ability of law enforcement agencies and regulators to track and stop illegal activities. Indore Development Authority v Manoharlal [2020] 3 SCR 1 Facts

A three Judge Bench of the Court had earlier interpreted Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ('the Act of 2013'). Later, in another appeal, the matter was referred to a larger Bench on 7.12.2017. The Court noticed that cases which have been concluded are being revived.The Court therefore, stated that the matter should be considered by a larger Bench and referredthe case to Honble the Chief Justiceof India for appropriate orders. This was the genesis behind Section 24(1)(a) and proviso to Section 24(2) which protect acquisitions from lapsing whilst providing for higher compensation under the Act of 2013 to the land owners under limited defined circumstances. Issues What is the correctinterpretation of Section24 of the Act of 2013? Does the provisionfor lapsing under Section 24 apply only when the award has been made, but possession has not been taken within five years, nor compensation has been paid? Does Section 24 of the Act of 2013 conferbenefit in the concluded proceedings? Arguments The learned senior counsel argued that Section 24 constitutes an exception to the general rule, i.e., lapsing of all acquisition proceedings, by reason of repeal of the Actof 1894, and operation of Section 114. Furthermore, it was argued that the non- obstante clause must be allowedto operate with full vigour in its own field.The petitioner has challenged the notification, the declaration, and the award as illegal. 144

The High Court has dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of laches. The land owners had argued that the obligation to pay gets discharged only when compensation is actually paid and/or deposited. Conclusion The Court held that the provision for lapsing under Section 24 is availableonly when the award has been made, but possession has not been taken within five years, nor compensation has been paid. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not confer benefit in the concluded proceedings, of which legality if question has to be seen in the appropriate proceedings. Madras Bar Association v Union of India and Anr [2020] 2 SCR 246 Issue: Constitutionality of various provisions concerning the selection, appointment, tenure, conditions of service, and ancillary matters relating to various tribunals, 19 in number, which act in aid of the judicial branch Decision: The 2020 Rules which came into force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette, i.e. 12.02.2020, cannot be given retrospective effect. In any event, subordinate legislation cannot be given retrospective effect unless the parent statute specifically provides for the same. Facts:

This Court has been calledupon to decidethe constitutionality of various provisions concerning the selection, appointment, tenure, conditions of service, and ancillary matters relating to various tribunals, 19 in number, which act in aid of the judicial branch. The vires of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was challenged in proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 was held to be unconstitutional. The constitutional validity of the provisions in Chapter XXVII of the Companies Act, 2013 was upheld. The Finance Act, 2017 and the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualification, Experience and Other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017 were challenged and struck down as being contrary to the principles of the Constitution. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 804 of 2020 filed by the Madras Bar Association is taken as the lead case. Reasoning: An autonomous oversight body should be established for recruitment of members and functioning of the Tribunals. Control of the tribunals by the executive is fraught and undermines their independence. Appointment of competentlawyers and technicalmembers is in furtherance of judicial independence. The 2020 Rules shall be amended to make advocates with an experience of at least 10 years eligible for appointment as judicial members in the Tribunals.

The involvement of this Court, in the series of decisions, underscores the importance of tribunals functioning independently and effectively to live up to their mandate.

Conclusion:The 2020 Rules which came into force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette, i.e. 12.02.2020, cannot be given retrospective effect. In any event, subordinate legislation cannot be given retrospective effect unless the parent statute specifically provides for the same.

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